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1 Introduction 
Since the mid-1970s a growing number of countries have adopted democracy as their 
form of government. The movement away from various forms of dictatorial rule 
began in Southern Europe, resulting in the now consolidated democracies of Spain, 
Portugal and Greece. It continued in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s in Latin 
America, and after 1989 the transitions in Central and Eastern Europe were enabled 
by the fall of Soviet Union. Samuel Huntington (1991) describes this period as the 
“third wave of democracy”.   
Prevailing opinion and theory holds that functioning democratic institutions are 
preferable for improving the living conditions of citizens, by among other factors, 
avoiding involvement in wars. However, installation of a democratic government 
does not necessarily lead to durability of the new democratic structure, or to progress 
toward creating a consolidated democratic regime. Huntington (1991:208) finds that 
in both the first and second reverse waves’ twenty countries with democratic political 
systems changed to authoritarian forms of government. So far democracy has endured 
in most of the third wave countries. According to the Polity IV data set (Marshall and 
Jaggers 2008), a majority of the third wave democracies had a democracy score1 of 8, 
9 or 10 by the end of 2007. Nigeria, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, and Nepal were 
placed between 4 and 7, while Pakistan and Sudan had reversed to autocracy. While 
the situation looks promising in Latin America and Europe, many countries, 
especially in the African continent, struggle to maintain, stabilize and develop newly 
established democratic institutions. 
 
                                              
1The score [0, 10] is a summation of points from five authority dimensions, competitiveness and 
regulation of political participation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, and 
constraints on chief executive (Jaggers and Gurr 1995:472).  
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Mauritanian President Maaouiya Ould Taya was overthrown in a bloodless military 
palace coup in August 3rd, 2005. The new Military Council for Justice and 
Democracy said it would rule the country for a transitional period of two years, after 
which it would organise fresh elections. The military junta carried through its 
promises, and free and fair presidential elections were held in 2007, appearing to 
herald a new era of democracy in Mauritania. However, on August 6th, 2008 troops 
overthrew the freely-elected President Abdallahi, and formed a state council to rule 
the country (BBC 2008). This is one of many examples of countries failing to 
maintain newly established democratic institutions, and returning to authoritarianism 
after a short period of experimenting with democratic procedures and institutions.  
The purpose of this thesis is to shed light on how different types of democratic 
transitions influence the probability of further democratic consolidation. My thesis is 
based on two basic assumptions. The first assumption is that the process of 
democratization can be conceptualized as two transitions (O'Donnell 1992:18). “The 
first is the transition from the previous authoritarian regime to the installation of a 
democratic government. The second transition is from this government to the 
consolidation of democracy or, in other words, to the effective functioning of a 
democratic regime (ibid.)”. Valenzuela (1992:73) asserts that “[t]he manner in which 
any new regime, whether authoritarian or democratic, is inaugurated has a significant 
effect over the regime's subsequent evolution”. Also Huntington (1991:276) defines 
the transition process itself as a possible condition affecting consolidation. Therefore, 
the second assumption is that the first phase of transition affects the second phase.  
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For the first phase of transition, the installation of a democratic government, I have 
chosen to apply a typology developed by Scott Mainwaring (1992:323), based on his 
study of transitions in Latin America and Southern Europe2. He categorizes three 
transition paths defined by the interactions between the authoritarian regime and the 
opposition:     
1. Transition through transaction: The authoritarian regime chooses to 
continue opening the political system. 
2. Transition through extrication: The authoritarian regime is weakened, 
but remains strong enough to dictate important terms of the transition. 
3. Transition through regime defeat: The authoritarian regime collapses or 
is overthrown. 
The typology above provides the background for the research question of this thesis:  
Which of the three democratic transitions, transaction, extrication or defeat, is 
connected to the highest probability of further democratic consolidation? 
Since Mainwaring actually applies and writes about his threefold typology to a 
limited degree, the definition and the categorization of the three modes of transition 
in this thesis is mainly based on Samuel Huntington’s (1991) The Third Wave, which 
is an extensive study of the three different transition processes. Huntington 
(1991:276) is however uncertain about the effect of mode to consolidation noticing 
that “[p]lausible arguments can be made for and against the helpfulness of each of 
these processes as far as consolidation is concerned”. Therefore, for the second phase 
of transition, from the installed democratic government to the consolidation of 
democracy, I create hypotheses based on how the mode of the first phase of transition 
can be related to two necessary conditions for consolidation suggested by O'Donnell 
                                              
2See Mainwaring and Viola 1985, Mainwaring and Share 1986 
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(1992:19); the importance of on the one hand avoiding authoritarian regression, while 
on the other pushing the democratization process further, toward consolidation. 
The independent variable in my study is a transition through transaction, extrication, 
or defeat leading to the installation of a first democratically elected government or 
chief executive after authoritarian rule in the time period of 1970-2000. The 
probability further of consolidation is operationalized as five dependent variables, all 
measuring different aspects of the continued transition process after the installation of 
first democratic government. The first dependent variable is the probability of 
authoritarian regression. The second dependent variable 'polity_next' measures the 
level of democracy after the next regime change following the installation democratic 
government. The third dependent variable 'polity_change' measures the direction and 
magnitude of the next regime change. The fourth dependent variable 'polity_future' is 
constructed by studying the long-term development pattern of the regime, in some 
cases measuring the obtained level of democracy in 2007. And the fifth dependent 
variable 'consolidation' is a dummy transformation of the 'polity_future', with a cut-
off point of polity score of 7.   
It should be kept in mind that my research design is not appropriate for measuring 
whether a country is a consolidated democracy. Consolidation is an abstract, 
constructed concept which implies that there is no 'final destination' of a consolidated 
democracy. The possibilities of both improvement and of having been 'the only game 
in town' only for a limited time can not be wiped out. In accordance, the concept of 
consolidation concerns both the institutional structure of democratic regime, and 
people’s beliefs and norms on whether political change and resolving political 
conflict should emerge within these structures (Linz and Stepan 1996:5). My 
dependent variables only measure changes in the institutional structure of regimes, 
such as level of constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executive, 
disregarding changes in the attitudinal aspects of consolidation, such as public 
opinion of whether democracy is the preferred form of government. Consolidation is 
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also dependent on how long the democracy has endured, and the short time frame 
between the explanatory and the dependent variables in some of my units creates 
limitation for defining the level of consolidation3. Therefore, the dependent variables 
must be interpreted as indications of further consolidation, rather than clear 
measurements of consolidation.  
By using both linear and logistic regression analyses of cross-sectional country data 
with 78 units, the continued transition process after the installation of the first 
democratic government is examined. I find that transitions through extrications, 
where both the authoritarian regime and the opposition influence the transition 
process, are related to the lowest probability of authoritarian regression and to the 
highest probability of further democratic change and consolidation of democracy. In 
extrications, which usually are non-violent and characterized by negotiations and 
consensus, the balanced power between the groups restrains a possible authoritarian 
regression, while the presence of the old elites encourages the opposition to develop, 
to strengthen, and to promote further democratic change. 
The results of the analyses also show that the effects of both defeats and transactions 
are contingent on the level of democracy obtained after the installation of the first 
democratic government. Defeats leading to the initial level of coherent democracy are 
related to a significantly higher probability of consolidation than defeats leading to 
semi-democracy. I argue that when a defeat of an authoritarian regime takes place 
through a military coup leading to the initial level of semi-democracy, the number of 
democratic actors in the country is still low and the number of authoritarian, or at 
least neutral actors, is high. Subsequently, the balance of power does not necessarily 
favour opposition to authoritarianism, which complicates the further democratization 
process. 
The results also indicate that transactions leading to the initial level of semi-
democracy are more supportive of consolidation than transactions leading to coherent 
                                              
3 The latest transitions in my study occurred in 2000, while the last year in my dependent variables is 2007. 
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democracy. It is possible that when a transaction leads first to semi-democracy, the 
democratic transition is more gradual and cautious, which enables the parts of the old 
elites, and parts of the population to adjust to, and to accept the new democratic 
system, while the opposition groups have better possibilities to develop, and to 
influence the further democratization process.  
My thesis is divided into five chapters. In chapter 2 I review existing literature on 
democratic transitions, conduct a theoretically based discussion how the different 
democratic transitions are related to probability of further consolidation, and develop 
hypotheses for the subsequent analysis. In chapter 3 I present the empirical approach 
for my inquiry, the operationalization of independent, dependent and control 
variables, and discuss methodological problems related to my research design. In 
chapter 4 the results of the regression analyses are reported and discussed, and the 
robustness of the models is examined. In chapter 5 I sum up the findings and propose 
improvements in the research design for further studies.  
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2 Literature Review 
The backbone of the studies of democratic transitions has been the modernization 
theory, which emphasizes that political transformations are determined by change in 
objective conditions (Przeworski 1986:47), such as change in class structure (Moore 
1965), or increased economic welfare (Lipset 1960, Doorenspleet 2005). However, 
when the new democratization wave swept through Latin America in the mid-1970, 
the modernization approach appeared to offer a less valid explanation of the events. A 
number of scholars, such as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986), found the theory 
offering an excessively deterministic picture of reality, and maintained that 
democratization was also an outcome of actions, not just of conditions (Przeworski 
1991). Instead of studying the impact of macro variables, the scholars concentrated 
on how the strategic behaviour of political actors (Higley and Burton 1989, Karl and 
Schmitter 1991, Przeworski 1991, Mainwaring 1992), and the type and characteristics 
of the previous regime (Linz and Stepan 1996) affected the transition process and the 
further consolidation of democracy. One of the most extensive works in this field is 
Samuel Huntington’s The Third Wave (1991), which studies the impact of both macro 
variables, the type of previous regime, and political actors' choices and actions on 
democratic transitions.  
In order not to end up with an excessively deterministic or voluntaristic picture of 
reality, I have chosen a research design that recognizes both changes in objective 
conditions and strategic behaviour of political actors as determinants for political 
transformations. For example Przeworski and Limongi’s (1997) find that democracies 
are not solely by-products of economic development; it is the actions of political 
actors that determine whether democracies are established or not, but high level of 
economic development increases their chances of survival. Or, as Bratton and van de 
Walle (1997:45) put it ”people can make their own history, even if not under 
conditions of their own choosing”. The independent variable in my study implies that 
actions and choices of political actors influence both the establishment of 
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democracies and the further probability of democratic consolidation. At the same 
time, the chosen statistical method allows me to control the effect of their choices for 
the effect of structural factors, such as the level of economic development, or level of 
democracy in the neighbouring countries. I have chosen not to analyze how the type 
of the previous regime affects the transition process. This is because Huntington’s 
(1991:115) categorization of the transition does not indicate any clear one-to-one 
relation. One-party regimes, personal dictatorships, and military regimes have 
changed to democratic systems through all the three modes of transition. 
In the following section 2.1 I present the typology of democratic transitions, which is 
applied to explain and systematize the first phase of transition, the installation of 
democratic government. In section 2.2 I give a brief theoretical definition of the 
concept of democratic consolidation, and present two necessary conditions and three 
guidelines for democratic actors, suggested by O’Donnell (1992:19), for a transition 
to a consolidated democracy. Finally, I will generate hypotheses that will serve as the 
starting point for the empirical analysis on how the three modes of transition are 
related to the probability of further consolidation.  
2.1 The First Transition: Installation of Democratic Government 
Various typologies of democratic transitions have been developed. For example 
Alfred Stepan (1986:64ff) finds eight to ten different paths towards 
redemocratization, and Donald Share (1987) develops a two-by-two matrix based on 
'democratization led by or against authoritarian regime' and 'the duration of the 
transition'. Mainwaring (1992:320-21) finds Stepan's typology too extensive asserting 
that Stepan is not categorizing paths, but rather which forces lead the different 
transitions. In contrast, Mainwaring perceives Shares's matrix too parsimonious, 
where several transitions in Latin America do not fit any of the four categories in the 
matrix.  
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Mainwaring (1992: 322) himself suggests a threefold typology of transaction, 
extrication, and defeat to capture the reality of transitions in Latin America. 
Mainwaring builds on J. Linz's (1978) work by adding the third intermediary 
category of extrication to Linz's transitions through reform (similar to transaction) 
and rupture (similar to defeat). The threefold typology, presented in the introduction, 
“indicates differential positions of power in the negotiations and interaction between 
regime and opposition, underscoring decisive differences in how much authoritarian 
regimes influence the transition process” (ibid.). Mainwaring's typology is identical 
with Samuel Huntington’s (1991:121ff) typology of transformation, transplacement 
and replacement. While Mainwaring actually applies and writes about the typology to 
a limited degree, Huntington gives extensive explanations on how 'third wave' 
countries democratized, categorizes 33 democratic transitions after their mode of 
transition in the time period of 1974-90, and develops normative 'Guidelines for 
Democratizers' on the basis of the mode of transition.  
2.1.1 The Typology 
According to Huntington (1991:121) “the crucial participants in the [democratization] 
processes were stand patters, liberal reformers, and democratic reformers in the 
governing coalition, and democratic reformers and revolutionary extremists in the 
opposition”.  
Table 2.1 Political Groups Involved in Democratization 
Attitudes toward Democracy 
 Against For 
Government Stand patters Democratic reformers/Liberals 
Opposition Radical Extremists 
Democratic 
Moderates 
    Source: Huntington (1991:121) 
Stand patters are members of the governing group opposing democratization. In non-
communist authoritarian systems the stand patters were normally right-wing, fascist, 
and nationalist. In communist regimes these were normally Stalinist or Brezhnevite 
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(ibid.). Huntington does not provide a clear definition of opposition4, but it is natural 
to asses that in authoritarian regimes this is hardly political opposition to the 
governing coalition, but rather different groups, such as trade unions or political 
parties, organized outside the government, or the mass of the populace. Graeme Gill 
(2000:210), writing about the post-Soviet transition, asserts that "[o]pposition élites 
are the leaders of independent organizations which emerged to challenge the ruling 
élite, civil society forces usually having their roots in society at large, reflected in 
mass support". It should be kept in mind that opposition in Mainwaring's and 
Huntington's typologies refers to opposition to authoritarianism and not to 
democracy, i.e. when referring to opposition I refer to democratic reformers outside 
the government.  
In 'transition through transaction' the authoritarian government initiates the process of 
liberalization and remains a decisive actor throughout the transition (Huntington 
1991:124, Mainwaring 1992:322). The authoritarian regime chooses to continue 
opening the political system because the costs of staying in power increase or the 
costs of liberalizing decrease, or because the initial idea was to intervene in a crisis 
situation and restore democracy after a short interlude (Mainwaring 1992:323). The 
democratic reformers are in power within the authoritarian regime (Huntington 
1991:129), but this does not imply that the opposition plays an insignificant role. 
According to Huntington (1991:139) the processes involved normally consultations 
with leaders of opposition, the political parties, and major social groups and 
institutions. In some instances formal negotiations and explicit agreements or pacts, 
while in other cases the consultations were more informal. However, the government 
is stronger than the opposition, and in the end it is the ancient regime that decides the 
speed and the progress of the transition. The prototypical cases of transaction were 
Spain, Brazil, and, among communist regimes, Hungary (Huntington 1991:125).  
                                              
4Huntington (1991:121) for example mentions that “in non-communist authoritarian systems the 
opponents of democratization in the opposition were normally left-wing, revolutionary, and Marxist-
Leninist”.   
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In 'transition through extrication' the authoritarian regime is weakened, but remains 
strong enough to dictate important terms of transition. The balance between the 
ancient regime and the opposition is quite equal, such that they both influence the 
speed and the progress of transition (Mainwaring 1992:323). Within the opposition 
the democratic moderates are strong enough to prevail over antidemocratic radicals, 
but they are not strong enough to overthrow the government. Within the government 
the balance between stand patters and reformers is such that the government is 
unwilling to initiate, but willing to negotiate a change of regime. It has to be pushed 
into formal or informal negotiations with the opposition (Huntington 1991:151). The 
most prototypical cases of extrication were Poland's and Uruguay's transition in the 
1980's. 
A 'transition through defeat' takes place when a major defeat of the authoritarian 
regime leads to the collapse of authoritarianism and the inauguration of a democratic 
government, such as transitions in Argentina in 1982-83, Portugal, Greece, 
Philippines, and Romania (Huntington 1991:113, Mainwaring 1992:322). Reformers 
within the regime are weak or nonexistent, and the stand patters dominate the regime. 
Democratization results from the opposition outside the regime gaining strength and 
the government losing strength until the government collapses or is overthrown 
(Huntington 1991:142).  
2.2 The Second Transition: Consolidation of Democracy 
The second transition phase is “from the installed democratic government to the 
consolidation of democracy or, in other words, to the effective functioning of a 
democratic regime” (O'Donnell 1992:18). Linz and Stephan (1996:5-6) find that 
consolidated democracy is a political situation where democracy has become “the 
only game in town”.  
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-Behaviourally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant 
national, social, economic, political, or institutional actors spend significant resources 
attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to 
violence or foreign invasion to secede from the state.  
-Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public 
opinion holds the belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most 
appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when the support 
for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-
democratic forces.  
-Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and 
nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, 
and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and 
institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process (ibid.).  
The above indicates that, in order to be regarded as a consolidated democracy, an 
overwhelming majority of people in a territory must embrace the norms and beliefs 
that political change and resolving political conflict must take place within the 
existing democratic procedures and institutions. And the possible minor fractions 
supporting antisystem alternatives must not attempt to overthrow the democratic 
government. 
O'Donnell (1992:19) asserts that there are two necessary conditions for a transition 
from a democratic government to a democratic regime. The first necessary condition 
is obvious, there ca be no authoritarian regression. According to O’Donnell (ibid.) 
authoritarian regression can occur through a “sudden death”, via a classic military 
coup, or it can occur through a “slow death”, in which there is “a progressive 
diminution of existing spaces for the exercise of civilian power and the effectiveness 
of the classic guarantees of liberal constitutionalism”. The second necessary condition 
is that the democratic actors must be able to push the process in such way that it 
moves forward to the consolidation of democracy (ibid.). These two conditions are in 
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accordance with Valenzuela’s (1992:59) claim that both durability and quality of a 
democratic regime are attributes of consolidation.  
O’Donnell (1992:21) suggests that in order to avoid authoritarian regression and to 
advance toward consolidation, democratic actors must at least: (a) neutralize those 
actors who are unconditionally authoritarian, either by isolating them politically or by 
turning them into fragmented sects which cannot threaten the survival of the regime, 
(b) in regard of those actors with more neutral attitudes toward democracy, promote 
preferences or at least practices which are compatible with the functioning of 
democracy, and (c) increase the number and intensity of democratic actors, and make 
the electoral sphere the critical locus of decision making in the important issues 
facing the nation.  
I regard O’Donnell’s guidelines for democratic actors for avoiding authoritarian 
regression and for advancing toward consolidation being in accordance with, or 
covering, the three aspects of consolidated democracies defined by Linz and Stepan 
(1996:6). The minor factions supporting authoritarian regime must become isolated in 
a matter that they do not attempt to overthrow the democratic government. There has 
to be change in the beliefs and norms of the majority of people, such that they rely on 
political change or resolving political conflict through the existing democratic 
channel. And democratic procedures and institutions must be maintained and 
progressed further. I will now develop hypotheses based on O’Donnell’s suggested 
necessary conditions for consolidation of a democratic regime.   
2.2.1 Hypothesis Generation 
The first condition for the path to consolidation of a democratic regime is that there 
can be no authoritarian regression. Transitions through transaction, such as the 
processes in Brazil and Spain, are often regarded as resulting in favourable conditions 
for consolidation of democracy (Hagopian 1992:244, O'Donnell 1992:31, O’Donnell 
and Schmitter 1986). O’Donnell (1992:31-37), however, finds that transactions, 
which often are preceded by a relatively high level of economic welfare and low 
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degree of repression, are complicated due to what he refers to as a “paradox of 
success”. The memory of the authoritarian regime is usually less negative, parts of the 
population (mostly bourgeoisie and the middle class) benefited from the authoritarian 
regime and therefore have more neutral attitudes toward democracy, there are 
continuities in the political personnel from the authoritarian regime to the new 
democratic one, and the civilian authorities may remain subordinate to the military 
power. Thus, there exists a possibility of authoritarian regression through a “slow 
death”, through a gradual diminution of the democratic system.  
On the other hand, O’Donnell (1992:31-33) also asserts that neither are transitions 
through defeat necessarily conducive to the consolidation of democracy. Defeats are 
often preceded by ruined economy and high degree of repression and violence. In 
addition, defeats can lead to a situation where the armed forces are politically 
defeated and thus likely hostile to the new democracy. This can provoke authoritarian 
regression through a “sudden death”, a classic military coup.  
H1: After transaction an authoritarian regression is more likely to occur through a 
“slow death”. 
H2: After defeat an authoritarian regression is more likely to occur through a 
“sudden death”. 
H3: There is no systematic difference between defeats and transactions and 
probability of authoritarian regression. 
The second necessary condition for consolidation is that the democratic actors must 
be able to push the process forward. To achieve consolidation, the democratic actors 
must neutralize authoritarian actors, promote democratic practices and preferences 
among the neutral actors, and increase in number. In cases of transaction, in addition 
to the fact that the balance of power favours the authoritarian regime, the “paradox of 
success” indicates that the number of authoritarian and neutral actors may be 
relatively high, and the number of strictly democratic actors low. Thus, the promotion 
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of further democratic change may become problematic. In contrast, in defeats the 
opposition becomes stronger than the authoritarian regime which eventually collapses 
with no emphasis on continuity in procedures, institutions, ideas or individuals 
(Huntington 1991:146-47). This indicates that the democratic actors are numerous, 
and that they have great possibilities to promote further democratic change. 
H4: Defeats are related to higher probability of further democratic change after the 
installation of democratic government than transactions. 
On the other hand, consolidation after defeats may be problematic due to the very fact 
that the old elites are swept away. Huntington (1991:142) finds that when the former 
opposition groups come to power following a defeat, the conflict enters a new phase 
as groups in the new government compete and struggle among themselves over the 
nature of the regime they should institute. This implies that the democratic actors may 
lose sight of their need to retain a strategic alliance against authoritarian forces 
(O’Donnell 1992:33). Thus, their possibilities to achieve consolidation are weakened. 
Huntington (1991:276) also hypotheses that defeats are less supportive of 
consolidation due to their conflict-prone and violent nature. 
The above indicates that extrications, where the balance between the old authoritarian 
elites and the new democratic elites is more equal, are most supportive of 
consolidation. Extrications are usually non-violent, the presence of the old elites 
creates stability, and helps the democratic actors to retain and strengthen their 
strategic alliance against the authoritarian forces, and the presence of the relatively 
strong opposition is conducive to maintaining and strengthening the newly 
established democratic institutions. Subsequently, the threat of authoritarian 
regression seems less imminent, and the new democratic elites can promote 
democratic preferences and practices among the neutral actors, and gradually increase 
in number and neutralize the old elites. In accordance, Huntington (1991:276) 
hypothesizes that extrications, characterized by negotiations and consensus, may be 
most supportive of consolidation. Also Munck (1994:364) finds that "the prospects of 
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democratic consolidation appear to be enhanced in those cases where the more or less 
balanced power between the authoritarian leaders and emerging opposition groups 
makes compromise on both sides an essential ingredient of the transition".  
 
H5: Extrications are related to the lowest probability of authoritarian regression. 
H6: Extrications are related to the highest probability of further democratic change 
after the installation of democratic government. 
H7: Extrications are related to the highest probability of further democratic 
consolidation. 
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3 The Empirical Approach and Methodology 
In this chapter I present and discuss the empirical assessment of the theoretical basis 
of the thesis. In the paragraphs below the applied data set is presented. In section 3.1 I 
briefly present the chosen analysis method, and in section 3.2 I explain the selection 
of the units for my analysis. In section 3.3 I present the operationalization of the 
independent variable; the empirical and theoretical basis for the coding of the three 
modes of transition. In sections 3.4 and 3.5 the operationalization of the chosen 
dependent and control variables is presented. Finally, in section 3.6, I discuss some 
methodological problems related to my research design. 
I have chosen to analyze statistically how the mode of transition is related to the 
further democratization process. For my inquiry I extend the MIRPS/SIP5 data set 
developed by Gates et al. (2006), based on the Polity IV project by Marshall and 
Jaggers (2008) and Vanhanen (2000). To the MIRPS/SIP data set I have added my 
covariate for mode of transition, transformed to a pair of dummy variables with 
defeat as reference category. I have also added the control variable for prior 
democratic experience, 'prior_dem',  for initial level of democracy, 'democracy', and 
for level of democracy in the neighbourhood, 'sipneighbour' and ‘sipneighb_next’. 
And finally, I have added the dependent variables measuring the probability of 
authoritarian ‘regression’, the level of democracy after the next regime change, 
'polity_next', the direction and magnitude of the next regime change, 'polity_change', 
the future level of democracy, ‘polity_future’, and the probability of 'consolidation', 
which is a dummy transformation of the ‘polity_future’. 
To construct the control variables and the dependent variable ‘regression’, I have 
applied the 'sip2' variable from the Gates et al. (2006) replication. The 'sip2' varies 
between 0 and 1, measuring the regulation, competitiveness, and openness of 
executive recruitment, the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-
                                              
5 Available at http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Governance/ 
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making powers of chief executives, and the number of citizens with voting rights 
(Codebook for MIRPS 2008). To construct the other dependent variables I have 
applied the 'polity' variable from the Polity IV project (Marshall and Jaggers 2008), 
which also takes into account changes that have occurred in the time period of 2000 
to 2007. The 'polity' variable varies between -10 (strongly autocratic), and 10 
(strongly democratic). It is a summation of autocracy (-) and democracy (+) points 
from competitiveness and regulation of political participation, competitiveness and 
openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on chief executive (Jaggers and 
Gurr 1995:472). The coding procedures are explained in greater detail in sections 3.3, 
3.4, and 3.5. 
3.1 Analysis Method 
The MIRPS/SIP data set by Gates et al. (2006) is adequate for analysing how the 
institutional characters of regimes affect the expected durability of regimes. They find 
that institutionally inconsistent regimes (those exhibiting a mix of institutional 
characteristics of both democracy and autocracy) are significantly less stable, i.e. 
shorter-lived, than institutionally consistent regimes (ibid: 893). Survival analysis is 
however not the most suitable method for my inquiry, since it only allows for 
measuring how long a regime exists before the institutional structure of that regime 
changes. The aim of my inquiry is to find out what happens with the regimes when 
they change; do they change toward a greater degree of democracy or autocracy. 
Given the prevailing opinion and theory on democracy as the preferred form of 
governance, short durability of inconsistent regimes can be regarded preferable if the 
regime ends due to further democratization, and vice versa.  
I have chosen to apply both linear and logistic regression analysis of cross-sectional 
country data, in which I observe all my units (countries with first democratic 
elections) at one moment of time having different qualities defined by the chosen 
independent variables. The aim is to find (co)variations between the units in regard of 
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these qualities, or in other words, to find correlations between the independent and 
the dependent variables (Skog 2005:71). In linear regression the dependent variable is 
metric, and usually continuous. The regression coefficients are estimated with the 
ordinary least squares (OLS) method. They measure how much and to what direction 
the dependent variable changes when the corresponding independent variable 
increases with one unit, holding all the other independent variables constant. A 
multivariate linear regression model can be written as:  
 Yi = b0 + b1·X1 + b2·X2 +...+bk·Xk +ei, 
where b0 is the intercept,  b1 ,..., bk   are the regression coefficients estimated by the 
independent variables, and e1 is the stochastic error term (Skog 2005:215, 222). 
In logistic regression the dependent variable is a dichotomous variable with only two 
values, usually 0 and 1. The aim is to study how the share having a particular value 
on the dependent variable changes for different values of the independent variable. 
But since shares per definition can only vary between 0 and 1, these are transformed 
to log odds of having the particular value on the dependent variable. The logarithmic 
transformation of the odds is carried out to extend the range of the latent dependent 
variable from - ∞ to + ∞. A multivariate logistic model can be written as:  
 Logit (Z) = = b0 + b1·X1 + b2·X2 +...+bk·Xk +ei,  
Due to the logarithmic transformation, interpreting regression coefficients is more 
complicated than in regular OLS regression. The coefficients measure how much the 
log-odds of having the value of 1 change when the corresponding independent 
variable increases with one unit, holding all the other independent variables constant. 
To make the interpretation of correlations between variables more precise and 
intuitive, it is better to apply odds ratios than log odds. The odds ratio measures the 
relative change in the odds of having the value 1 in the dependent variable resulting 
from a one unit increase in an explanatory variable, controlled for all other variables. 
Odds ratios are antilogarithms of the log odds (the regression coefficients), marked 
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with Exp (B) in the results (Skog 2005:352-66). The results can also be interpreted by 
calculating the proportions having the value of 1 in the dependent variable. When the 
coefficients are estimated, the logit Z can be calculated for different values on the 
explanatory variables. Subsequently, the proportions having the value of 1 are 
calculated from the equation   . Proportions can be interpreted as the 
probability of having the value of 1 in the dependent variable (Skog 2005:358-59). 
3.2 The Units 
The units in my analysis are states that have experienced the first phase of transition, 
the installation of a democratic government in the time period of 1970-2000. I have 
chosen to operationalize this as installation of first democratically elected 
government after authoritarian rule. O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:57) define the 
concept of 'founding election' as “when, for the first time after an authoritarian 
regime, elected positions of national significance are disputed under reasonably 
competitive conditions”. I have operationalized 'elected positions' as elected 
government or chief executive, and 'reasonably competitive conditions' by excluding 
cases where the level of democracy measured in 'sip2' remains below 0.3 after the 
elections.  
My study is based on Gates et al. (2006) data set, and to find my units I tracked 
democratic transition where at least one of following indicators change: 1) movement 
from one category to another in the Executive Recruitment dimension6, 2) change of 
at least two units in the Executive Constraints dimension7, 3) 100% increase in 
                                              
6The executive recruitment dimension is constructed out of three Polity IV indicators: Regulation of 
Executive Recruitment (XRREG), Competitiveness of Executive Recruitment (XRCOMP) and 
Openness of Executive Recruitment (XROPEN) (Codebook for MIRPS 2008).  
7Executive constraints dimension refers to the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-
making powers of chief executives. The variable measures the level of ‘checks and balances’ in 
decision-making process with a seven-category scale stretching from (1) Unlimited Authority to (7) 
Executive Parity or Subordination (Codebook for Polity II 2008). 
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number of citizens with voting rights (Gates et al. 2006:898). In most of my units at 
least two of the indicators change simultaneously. After tracking the democratic 
transitions in the data set, I studied whether these transitions were suitable as units for 
my inquiry, and collected data for further coding process. The list of my units can be 
found in appendix 1. 
The creators of the MIRPS/SIP data set have not been consistent in their selection of 
which events lead to changes in the coding of variables measuring the level of 
democracy/autocracy. Therefore, the start date of my units may be the date when 
political parties became legal, the date of a new constitution8, the date of elections, or 
the date new president takes office. In addition, in the later transitions, such as those 
in Eastern Europe, the data set takes into account the stepwise transition process 
toward democracy, defining several of the events mentioned above as start dates of  a 
new regime. In the earlier transitions, such as those in Latin America and Southern 
Europe, there is only one event defining the start date. When there were several start 
dates to choose between, I chose the date of first elections, or the date closest to first 
elections as the start date9 . 
3.3 Coding Criteria 
I will now present and explain how the coding of the three modes of transition is 
carried through. My categorization of transitions is based on the requirements of the 
necessary criteria, while supporting criteria are mainly used as assurance for my 
coding. The coding of the units can be found in appendix 1.  
Necessary Criteria 
The difference between extrication and transaction is diffuse, especially since both 
transaction and extrication include negotiations between the old regime and the 
                                              
8For these units I have marked the date of elections in appendix 1.  
9In cases of Russia and Poland I chose the last start date in the stepwise transition process.  
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opposition. And as Huntington (1991:124) notices: "The line between transformations 
and transplacements [transactions and extrications] is fuzzy, and some cases might be 
legitimately classified in either category". The criterion of which political group 
decides the speed and progress of the transition process has been decisive for my 
categorization (Table 2.1). In cases of transaction the interactions between the 
reformers and the stand patters within the authoritarian government that decides the 
speed and course of the transition.   In contrast, in cases of extrication both ancient 
regime and the opposition influence the speed and course of transition. The central 
interaction is between democratic reformers inside the government and opposition 
elites (moderates) outside the government, with each being able to dominate the 
antidemocratic groups on its side of the line (Huntington 1991:124). I have for 
example defined the following incidences as indications of transition through 
extrication: if the opposition manages to influence which date is settled as the date of 
elections, or if national conferences, held in many countries in Africa, declared 
themselves as sovereign. 
After studying cases classified as defeat by Huntington, I found that these transitions 
followed quite similar pattern. Since stand patters dominate the regime, the 
opposition outside the regime must become strong enough to wear down the regime. 
The erosion of support for the regime often occurred covertly given the repressive 
character of the regime, and then manifested itself when some triggering event 
exposed the weakness of the regime. Greece and Argentina, for example, suffered the 
humiliation of military defeat, and the Portuguese and Philippine regimes were 
unable to win counterinsurgency wars (Huntington 1991:143-46). Subsequently, the 
authoritarian regime or the head of state is either overthrown, or obliged to resign. 
The process continues with an establishment of a transitional government, where 
usually the army continues to rule until the civilian rule is restored. Finally, a new 
constitution comes to effect, and the country holds free elections. This transition 
process can better be described as a regime collapse than a regime change, it happens 
relatively quickly (ibid.). 
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It is important to notice that not only defeats, but also transactions may be preceded 
by a coup. There are two possible occasions. First, a coup may occur in transactions if 
the military section intervenes in a crisis situation with the aim of restoring the 
democracy after a period with authoritarian rule (Mainwaring 1992:323). In these 
cases the regime usually stays authoritarian several years before they start to 
liberalize. In contrast, in transitions through defeat the new ruling (military) regime 
initiates a transitional government and starts the democratization process 
immediately after the coup. Transactions may also be preceded by a coup since 
democratic reformers have to be in power within the authoritarian regime for 
democratization to take place. And when the old leaders did not die (Spain and 
Taiwan), or were regularly changed (Brazil), the democratic reformers had to oust the 
ruler and install prodemocratic leadership. In military governments this meant the 
replacement by coup d’état of one military leader by another (Peru, Ecuador, Nigeria, 
and Guatemala) (Huntington 1992:129-31). For example Oscar Humberto Mejia 
replaced Rios Montt in a coup in Guatemala in 1983. This can however not be 
categorized as a defeat of the military regime, but only as change of head figures. 
President Montt had initiated the liberalization process by advancing the timetable for 
the return to elected rule. After the elections the current head of state, Mejia, assured 
that the military had no intention of continuing to exercise political influence. 
However, the outgoing military rulers managed to posit exit guarantees in form of a 
decree ruling out the possibility of officers being brought to trial by the new civilian 
government. 
A weakness in Huntington's study is that he has no clear definition of opposition. 
Huntington (1991:145) asserts that in transitions through defeat “the opposition 
outside the regime gains strength and the government loses strength until the 
government collapses or is overthrown”. Huntington (1991:146) also recognizes that 
a mass mobilization of citizens to overthrow a regime is a rare event. In the third 
wave defeats, “people power” played a decisive role only in East Germany, Romania 
and Philippines. It is more common that authoritarian regimes are overthrown by 
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military factions in a coup, such as in Greece and Portugal. The question is whether 
all kinds of coups by military factions should be regarded as defeats by 'opposition', 
or whether some degree of popular support is also needed to fulfil the theoretical 
requirement of the opposition becoming stronger than the government. In other 
words, when a small military faction manages to overthrow the government, has there 
really been a change in the balance of power between the opposition and the 
authoritarian regime, or should this be regarded as some kind of struggle inside the 
authoritarian regime, a change of head figures. I have chosen to categorize transitions 
through a military coup, such as Ethiopia in 1994, Cambodia in 1998, and Thailand in 
1975, 1978, and 1992, as defeats of the authoritarian regime. I have marked the seven 
defeats through 'people power' in appendix 1. 
Supporting Criteria 
The events of supporting criteria do not take place under every transition, and these 
criteria alone are not sufficient indicators for coding. The exceptions from the rule are 
actual foreign invasions, Haiti, Panama, and Uganda, which I have chosen to define 
as defeats of the authoritarian regime. 'Exit guarantees' are relevant only in some 
cases of transitions from military regimes to democratic ones. Huntington (1991:116) 
finds that military leaders often posit two conditions or "exit guarantees" for their 
withdrawal from power. First, there is to be no prosecution, punishment, or other 
retaliation against military officers for acts they may have committed when they were 
in power. Second, the institutional role and autonomy of the military establishment 
must be respected, including its overall responsibility for national security. In 
transaction the military leaders are able to assure their demands for exit guarantees, 
while in cases of extrication negotiations with civilian leaders lead to modification of 
these demands. In cases of defeat the military leaders may ask for assurances, but 
their requests are rejected by civilian leaders. 
The role of external pressure and threat of foreign invasion is used to differentiate 
extrications from transactions. In extrications the pressure from opposition to 
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democratize may include an influence from a foreign power, and in the negotiations a 
foreign state or an organization may act as a surrogate for democratic moderates 
(ibid: 151-152). For example in  Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras, all classified 
as extrications by Huntington (1991:113), the US aid or withdrawal from invasion 
was conditional on political and economic reforms. However, cases with external 
pressure to democratize without any noticeable influence from opposition inside the 
country do not qualify as extrications, but are coded as transactions. The speed of 
transition has been a less important criterion for my coding. I expected it could help 
to differentiate transactions from defeats; however, many transitions in Africa, 
following the patterns of both transaction and extrication, have taken place within the 
time frame of two years. 
The following tables are based on the theoretical framework described in this section 
and in section 2.1.1, my study of 78 democratic transitions, and comparison of my 
empirical findings with categorization of transition processes by Huntington 
(1991:113) and Mainwaring (1992:321). 
 
Table 3.1 Necessary Criteria 
 Transaction 
(3) 
Extrication 
(2) 
Defeat 
(1) 
Political Group 
Influencing the Speed 
and Progress of the 
Process 
Democratizers and 
stand patters inside the 
authoritarian regime 
 Both opposition and  
authoritarian regime 
Opposition/Transitional 
government  
Negotiations Between 
Ancient Regime and 
Opposition 
Yes  
(1) 
Yes  
(1) 
No (0), eventually 
between transitional 
government and 
opposition  
Head of State/Ancient 
Regime 
Resigns or participates 
new elections 
voluntarily 
Resigns or participates 
new elections due to 
pressure from opposition 
Obliged to resign/ 
Removed in a coup or 
revolution 
Triggering Factor for 
Democratization 
Ancient regime initiates 
voluntarily 
Ancient regime initiates 
due to pressure from 
opposition 
Opposition mobilization or 
some triggering event, 
such as military defeat. 
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Table 3.2 Supporting Criteria 
 Transaction Extrication Defeat 
Exit Guarantees Yes Yes, but modified No 
The Speed of 
Transition10 
Slow 
(1) 
Slow 
(1) 
Fast 
(0) 
External Pressure Irrelevant Yes Leads to invasion 
Foreign Invasion Irrelevant As a threat Yes 
3.4 Probability of Democratic Consolidation 
In this section, I explain the operationalization of the dependent variables chosen to 
characterize the further transition process after the installation of first democratic 
government. Valenzuela (1992:58) finds that there is a “complex relationship of 
continuity and discontinuity between the first and the second transitions”. The 
transition toward consolidation includes the strengthening of the institutions and 
procedures created during the first phase of transition. However, building a 
consolidated democracy often requires abandoning or altering some of the 
arrangements, agreements, and institutions that may have facilitated the first 
transition, but that are inimical to the second transition. Therefore, the process is 
seldom purely ascending, but often precedes one step forward, two steps back (ibid.). 
In order to obtain as valid and adequate prediction of the probability of further 
consolidation as possible, I have constructed five dependent variables, all measuring 
different aspects of how the transition process continues further after the installation 
of democratically elected government, or chief executive.  
The operationalization of the dependent variables is conditional on how the 'polity' 
and 'sip2' variables (applied in the 'regression' variable) measure the level of 
democracy or autocracy. Both variables measure changes in the institutional structure 
                                              
10More than two years from the announcement of democratization to the start date of a new regime is 
coded as slow. 
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of regimes; the competitiveness and regulation of political participation, 
competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, and constraints on chief 
executive. The operationalization does not cover any attitudinal aspects of 
democracy, such as public opinion of whether democracy is the preferred form of 
government. Changes in the institutional structure can naturally be interpreted as 
reflections of changes in people's norms and beliefs. The operationalization of the 
dependent variables is also conditional on the impossibility of predicting the future. 
The dependent variables are restricted to the last year in the Polity data set, 2007, and 
since the latest democratic transitions have occurred in 2000, the time frame for a 
possible authoritarian regression or democratic consolidation for some of the units is 
relatively short, only seven years. Therefore, my dependent variables must be 
interpreted as indications of further consolidation, rather than clear measurements of 
consolidation. Table 3.3 presents six example units’ polity scores in the Polity IV data 
set.  Table 3.4 presents how the dependent variables are constructed for these six 
units. 
Table 3.3 Polity Scores 
1993 1994 1999   
41 Haiti 
-7 7 -88   
1981 1982 1985 1989 1999-2007 
91 Honduras 
-88 6 5 6 7 
1983 1984 1990 1995 2007 
93 Nicaragua 
-5 -1 6 8 9 
1979 1980 1990 1992 1993 2000 
135 Peru 
-88 7 8 -3 1 -88 
1991 1992 1996 2001 2004-2007 
452 Ghana 
-88 -1 2 6 8 
1989 1990 1999 2002  
790 Nepal 
-2 5 6 -6  
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Table 3.4 Construction of the Dependent Variables  
 regression polity polity_next polity_change polity_future consolidation
41 Haiti 1 7 -10 -17 -10 0 
91 Honduras 0 6 5 -1 7 1 
93 Nicaragua 0 -1 6 7 9 1 
135 Peru 1 7 8 1 -10 0 
452 Ghana 0 -1 2 3 8 1 
790 Nepal 1 5 6 1 -6 0 
3.4.1 Authoritarian Regression 
As noticed in section 2.2, a necessary condition for democratic consolidation is to 
avoid authoritarian regression. The first dependent variable simply measures whether 
the country has reversed to authoritarianism after the installation of democratic 
government. The variable 'regression' is coded as 1(yes), if a country's ‘sip2’value 
changes to lower than 0.3 before 200011, or if a country's polity-score in the Polity IV 
data set  changes to  equal to or lower than -5 after 200012. If a country experiences 
civil war (-77)13, the consolidation is regarded as failed, and this is coded as a 
regression. I have made this choice since there are only six transitions followed by 
civil war, Guinea Bissau, Cote d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone, Uganda, Lesotho, and 
Comoros. Also, if a country experiences a new transitional period (-88)14 in the time 
period of 2000-2007, the consolidation is regarded as failed, and this is coded as a 
                                              
11 I have chosen the value of 0.3 since my units, defined as democratic transitions, have sip2 values 
between 0.311 and 0.980.  
12I apply Jaggers and Gurr's (1995:479) suggested cut-off point, -5. They distinguish between 
«coherent democracies», «coherent autocracies», and «anocracies».  
13-77 indicates a period of interregnum, during which there is a complete collapse of central political 
authority, most likely a period of internal war (Codebook for Polity II) 
14-88 indicates a period of transition where new institutions are planned, legally constituted, and put 
into effect. Democratic and quasi-democratic polities are particularly likely to be established 
(Codebook for Polity II) 
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regression (for example Haiti and Peru in Table 4.3.1). I have made this choice since 
these cases would probably qualify as new units for my analysis, if my selection of 
units was not restricted to the year 2000. Otherwise 'regression' is coded as 0 (no).  
3.4.2 The 'Next' Level of Democracy 
In addition to avoiding regression, democratic actors have to push the 
democratization process further, toward consolidation (O’Donnell 1992:19). In some 
cases the level of democracy is high already right after the installation of the first 
democratic government. For example Peru and Haiti have the polity value of 7, while 
Nicaragua and Ghana have the polity value of -1 (Table 3.3). The obtained level of 
democracy after the next regime change and the magnitude and direction of the next 
regime change often indicates whether the country is moving toward consolidation. 
The installation of new democratic government may be followed by a full-scale 
authoritarian regression, minor adjustment of the political system toward either a 
slightly more democratic or more authoritarian system (Honduras, Peru, Ghana and 
Nepal in Table 3.3), or a clear increase in the level of democracy, through for example 
second democratic elections leading to victory for the opposition candidates 
(Nicaragua in Table 3.3).  
The second dependent variable 'polity_next' measures the obtained level of 
democracy in a country after the next regime change, or in other words, the next 
change following the installation of democratic government. If a country experiences 
civil war or a new transitional period after 2000, the consolidation is regarded as 
failed, and the 'polity_next' is coded as -10. If there are no further changes in the data 
set the 'polity_next' has the same value as 'polity', which measures the level of 
democracy right after the installation of democratic government15. 
The 'polity_next' variable measures the level of democracy after the next change of 
regime, but it does not reveal whether the next change is toward a more democratic or 
                                              
15In case of Czechoslovakia I applied the next polity value of Czech Republic. 
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more authoritarian system. Therefore, I have constructed a third dependent variable, 
'polity_change'. This variable measures the direction and magnitude of the next 
regime change following the installation of democratically elected government, or 
chief executive. Table 3.4 shows that Honduras experiences a minor negative change 
toward a more authoritarian system, Peru, Ghana, and Nepal experience minor 
positive changes becoming slightly more democratic, while Haiti and Nicaragua go 
through more extensive positive and negative changes.   
3.4.3 The Future Level of Democracy 
The previous two dependent variables measured the stepwise development of 
regimes, both forwards and backwards. However, in many cases minor adjustments 
of the regime toward a slightly more authoritarian or more democratic system are 
followed by bigger steps toward democracy, or vice versa. For example Peru moves 
gradually toward a new transitional period, which I have chosen to interpret as a 
failed consolidation, while Ghana is steadily moving toward higher level of 
democracy, as shown in Table 3.3. The fourth dependent variable 'polity_future' is 
constructed by studying the long-term development pattern of regimes. It measures 
the obtained level of democracy in the Polity IV data set by 2007, with the following 
exceptions: If the installation of democratic government, or chief executive, is 
followed by civil war or a new transitional period after 2000, consolidation is 
regarded as failed, and the polity_future is coded as -10 (Haiti and Peru in Table 3.4). 
If the first phase of transition is followed by authoritarian regression, the 
'polity_future' is the corresponding value of equal to or lower than -5 (Nepal in Table 
3.4). Otherwise the 'polity_future' is the country's polity value in 2007.  
The final dependent variable 'consolidation' is a dummy transformation of the 
'polity_future' variable; hence it is a more precise and excluding measurement of 
consolidation than the previous three dependent variables. To be categorized as a 
'consolidated democracy' a country has to have the 'polity_future' value equal to or 
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higher than 7 in 200716. Table 3.3 presents the stepwise democratization processes in 
Honduras, Nicaragua and Ghana until the last year in my study, 2007. They all have 
obtained level of democracy equal to or above the polity score of 7, and coded as 
'consolidated democracies', as shown in the Table 3.4.  
 3.5 Control Variables  
GDP  
According to Lipset (1960) economic development is a key precondition for 
democratic rule. Also Huntington (1991:272) asserts that presence of an 
industrialized, modern economy with educated population is correlated with the 
existence of democratic regimes, and that high level of economic development is 
conducive to the consolidation of democratic regimes. The variable is measured as 
the average logarithm of GDP per capita in constant 1995 dollars for the five years 
preceding the end date of each annual time segment. The variable is adopted from 
Gates et al. (2006). They use World Bank data for the period 1960 to 1998.   
Initial Level of Democracy 
A number of empirical studies imply that the combination of autocratic and 
democratic institutions in a regime plays a significant role in determining its stability. 
Studies by Gurr (1974), Sanhueza (1999), Hegre et al. (2001), and Gates et al. (2006) 
demonstrate that consistent democracies and consistent autocracies are the most 
stable political systems17. This indicates that if the level of democracy in a country is 
high already after the installation of democratic government, the probability of 
authoritarian regression is lower, and the probability of consolidation of the 
democratic regime is higher.  
                                              
16I apply Jaggers and Gurr's (1995:479) suggested cut-off point, 7. They distinguish between 
«coherent democracies», «coherent autocracies», and «anocracies».  
17Referring to duration of different regimes, i.e. how long they last. 
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I have transformed the 'sip2' variable from Gates et al. (2006) replication into a 
categorical variable 'democracy', which measures the level of democracy in a country 
after the installation of democratic government. The units in the data set have ‘sip2’ 
values between 0.311 and 0.980. I have coded values equal to or higher than 0.70 as 
consistent democracies, and values below 0.70 as semi-democracies. I will refer to 
this variable as the 'initial level of democracy' further in the thesis. 
Level of Democracy in the Neighbouring Countries 
Gleditsch and Ward (2006:911) find that “the scope and extent of connections with 
other democratic countries in the region can strengthen support for democratic reform 
and help sustain institutions in transitional democracies”. Also Huntington (1991:273) 
suggests that an external environment supportive of democracy is conducive to 
consolidation. The variable 'sipneighbour' measures the average level of democracy 
in neighbouring countries18. I have computed this variable by adding the country's 
'sip2' value to the country's 'sip2avgnabo' value. The 'sip2avgnabo' measures the 
difference between the institutional structure of a country in question and all its 
neighbouring countries, ranging from -0.965 to 0.935. For some reason the three 
isolated states, Madagascar, Comoros, and Fiji, obtained a 'sipneighbour' value 
greater than 1 when I added up their ‘sip2’ and ‘sip2avgnabo’ values19. Therefore, I 
computed the averages of their neighbour's 'sip2' values manually. In case of 
Madagascar, I applied the values of Comoros, Mauritius, and Mozambique. For 
Comoros I applied the values of Tanzania, Mozambique, and Madagascar. And for 
Fiji I applied the values of New Zealand, Australia, and Papua New Guinea.   
For the analyses of the future level of democracy, I have adjusted the 
operationalization of the ‘sipneighbour’ variable. The variable ’sipneighb_next’ 
measures the average level of democracy in the neighbouring countries the year the 
                                              
18 “A political neighbourhood consists of all contiguous countries with either a common border or less 
than 150 nautical miles of water between them (Gates et al 2006:899)”. 
19This must be somehow related to either missing values, or to the fact that Gates et al. (2006:899) 
measure the average political distance from isolated islands to all countries in the world. 
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unit in question experiences the next regime change, or in other words, the next 
change following the installation of democratic government. If there are no further 
changes in the data set I have applied the value of the last year in the data set, 2000. 
There are two reasons for this adjustment. First, the last two dependent variables 
measure the future level of democracy, in many of the units concerning the year 
2007, which makes the time frame between the ‘sipneighbour’ and the dependent 
variables for some of the units quite long. And second, a number of the units defined 
as consolidated democracies (the level of democracy ≥7) in 2007 have been 'the first 
ones out' to democratize. And naturally, the units democratizing first have extremely 
low 'sipneighbour' scores, while the ones following their example have higher scores. 
I regard the adjustment of the operationalization increasing the validity of data; in 
addition to reducing the time frame between the variables, the ‘sipneighb_next’ takes 
better into account the development in the average level of democracy in the 
neighbouring countries.  
Prior Democratic Experience 
According to Huntington (1991:270), prior democratic experience is a condition 
favouring democratic consolidation, since few countries create stable democratic 
systems on their first try. Huntington also hypothesizes that a longer and more recent 
experience with democracy is more conducive to consolidation than is a shorter and 
more distant one. If the country has had a 'sip2' value greater than 0.3 after 1950, the 
variable 'prior_dem' is coded as 1 (yes), otherwise 0 (no). I have chosen the value of 
0.3 by finding the ‘sip2’ values of countries Huntington (1991:272) mentions having 
prior democratic experience. It is also natural to choose the level of 0.3 since my 
units, defined as democratic transitions, have ‘sip2’ values down to 0.311.  
 
Table 3.5 presents the distribution of the units in the two categorical control variables 
and in the two categorical dependent variables applies in the analysis.  
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Table 3.5 Number of Units in Categorical Variables 
  Defeat Extrication Transaction Total  
No 7 9 16 32 Prior Democratic 
Experience Yes 14 14 18 46 
Semi-democracy 10 5 15 30 Initial Level of 
Democracy Democracy 11 18 19 48 
No 11 20 21 52 Regression 
Yes 10 3 13 26 
No 13 9 22 44 Consolidation 
Yes 8 14 12 34 
Total  21 23 34 78 
3.6 Methodological discussion 
I will first discuss the validity and reliability of the data; whether the units and 
variables in my study are suitable to illuminate my research question. Further, I will 
review and discuss some (dis)advantages related to the chosen statistical method. 
3.6.1 Validity and Reliability of Data 
Data's validity concerns conformity between my theoretical and operational 
definitions; whether I have measured the qualities relevant for my research question. 
Data's reliability depends on whether I have measured these qualities correctly; it is 
about the exactness and precision of measuring data (Hellevik 2002:52-53, 471). 
When it comes to the selection of units, my theoretical definition refers to installation 
of a democratic government. I chose not to restrict my selection of units to any 
particular theoretical definition of a democratic government, but to operationalize this 
as countries with founding election. I have excluded elections leading to a ‘sip2’ 
value below 0.3, since I regarded the validity of these units insufficient. These are 
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usually transitions in Africa where first multi party elections are held, but the 
opposition parties boycott the elections, or the elections are neither free nor fair, and 
therefore the installed government can not be characterized as democratically elected.  
The cut-off point of 0.3 has created some reliability problems due to sip2 values 
incoherence with the polity scores. For example, Mauritania's ‘sip2’ value is above 
0.3 after its first multi party elections, but its polity score remains -5, which actually 
is the cut-off point of authoritarian regression. However, I chose to include 
Mauritania in the analyses since I have relatively few units, and since my main 
interest is the further development of the democracy. Due to the incoherence between 
the polity and sip2 variables, when measuring the variable 'regression', I relied on 
sip2 values until 2000, and polity values only between 2000 and 2007.   
I have operationalized my independent variable as a transition leading to installation 
of a democratically elected government, categorized after Mainwaring's and 
Huntington's typology on democratic transition. The question is whether it is 
misleading to apply the typology to only the first phase of transition. It is quite 
evident that they have based their classification of transitions on longer periods of 
time than only until the first democratic elections after the authoritarian rule (for 
example in the case of Nicaragua). The choice of applying the typology only for the 
first phase of transition may decrease the validity of my research design. However, 
my empirical study of transitions has shown that if I also had included cases with 
second democratic elections, there had been an overwhelming majority of 
transactions. This is because after the first democratic government is installed, the 
possible further democratization is often initiated by the existing government, with 
less influence from the opposition outside. Restricting my empirical study of 
transition to the first democratic elections was also necessary since I needed enough 
units for a statistical model, but at the same time I had to be able to read extensive 
empirical material for each unit, within the time available. However, this may have 
reduced the reliability of my coding, since it is more challenging to get a 
comprehensive impression of the transition, and for example to take into account that 
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transitions sometimes can start as one type, and change to another type later 
(Huntington 1991:114).  
I have not questioned the categorizing made by Huntington, but throughout followed 
Huntington's coding. The only exception is Sudan, which Huntington (1991:113) 
defines as transaction, but where I found clear evidence of defeat. This allowed me to 
concentrate on the transitions that were not categorized by Huntington, and to study 
empirically a number of transitions in each category to develop the coding criteria. 
The availability of empirical material for some of my units, especially countries in 
Africa, has created measuring problems. If I did not regard the information in the 
Keesings's News Archive as sufficient, I also studied other relevant literature on 
transitions. Also my own expectations, or unconscious wishes, on the mode of 
transition may have influenced the reliability of my coding. However, following 
strictly and conscientiously the coding criteria has reduced this problem. 
The theoretical definition of my dependent variable is 'transition from the installed 
democratic government to the consolidation of democracy'. In order to obtain as valid 
explanation of the further transition process as possible, I have operationalized five 
different dependent variables. I argue that the final two dependent variables, 
'polity_future' and 'consolidation', are the most valid indicators of further 
consolidation. 'Polity_future' covers the dependent variable of authoritarian 
regression, and measures the latest level of democracy in the stepwise 
democratization process. The 'consolidation' in addition differs between those having 
the latest level of democracy below and above the cut-off point of 7. The validity of 
these two variables is reduced since they do not take into account time. There is a 
difference between having the polity value of 7 for one year and having it for ten 
years. Only one year can always be a small step forward before a huge step back. It is 
clear that further studies are needed in this area. By expanding the time frame, and 
the number of units, the duration of a democratic regime could also be taken into 
account.  
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The concept of democratic consolidation naturally carries an implicit definition of 
what democracy is. Robert Dahl (1971:3) defines eight institutional requirements for 
democracy: freedom to form and join organizations, freedom of expression, right to 
vote, eligibility for public office, right of political leaders to compete for support and 
votes, alternative sources of information, free and fair elections, and institutions for 
making government policies depend on votes and other expressions of preference. 
One can argue that the polity score, only measuring competitiveness and regulation of 
political participation, competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, and 
constraints on chief executive, is not a sufficient measurement of democracy. It does 
not take into account political rights and civil liberties at individual level, such as 
Dahl’s requirements for democracy. The cut-off point of 7 in the last dependent 
variable gives an impression of a quite strong democracy, especially since the polity 
score ranges from -10 to 10. However, the Freedom in the World survey (Freedom 
House 2008) gives a more pessimistic picture of the level of democracy (or freedom) 
in some of my units. Freedom House categorizes countries as 'free', 'partly free', or 
'not free', dependent on their level of political rights and civil liberties at individuals’ 
level. The only countries having the polity score of 7, and defined as 'free' by the 
Freedom House in 2007 were Benin and El Salvador, while others with the polity 
score of 7 were defined as only 'partly free'.  
I also found some incoherence between my units’ polity scores in 2007 and whether 
these countries were defined as ‘not free’, ‘partly free’ or ‘free’. Countries classified 
as ‘free’ had the polity scores between 5 and 10, countries classified as ‘not free’ had 
the polity scores between -10 and 5, while ‘partly free’ countries varied between -6 
and 9. For example, a country with a polity score of 9 is defined as less free than a 
country with polity score of 5. In accordance, Table 3.6 shows that the standard 
deviations of the polity scores in the categories for ‘not free’ and ‘partly free’ are 
quite large. In the category for ‘free’ the average polity is 8.5 with a standard 
deviation of 1.4. This indicates that the last dependent variable of consolidation, with 
the cut-off point of 7, measures the level of democracy, covering both the institutional 
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structure, and political rights and civil liberties of individuals, in a sufficient matter. 
In addition, since the dependent variables are indications rather than clear 
measurements of democratic consolidation, I regard the validity of my data sufficient. 
Table 3.6 Mean Polity Scores in the Freedom House Categories in 2007 
Freedom Mean N St. Dev. 
Not Free -1.11 9 4.51 
Partly Free 4.00 32 4.50 
Free 8.48 29 1.38 
Total 5.20 70 4.76 
3.6.2 Advantages and Pitfalls of Statistical Modelling 
There are a number of reasons to apply statistical methods to study the subject of 
democratization, rather than for example a comparative case-study method. First, too 
little has been done to test quantitatively widely recognized theoretical assertions 
regarding democratic transitions. Second, I wish to offer a plausible argument for a 
common effect of the transition path on further democratic consolidation, and the 
statistical method’s greatest advantage is its potential for generalization. Third, 
statistical method allows me to assess, compare, and exclude rivalling explanations. 
The method opens for controlling the effect of the variables of main interest for 
confounding variables, gives systematic information of the relative effects of 
variables included, and reduces the problem of causal over determination (Skog 
2005:259, Frendreis 1983:259). In my study, statistical method opens for controlling 
the effect of choices and decision made by the key actors in regard of the transition 
process for confounding macro variables, such as the level of economic development. 
Despite the statistical method’s advantages in regard of my inquiry’s purpose, there 
are some pitfalls to be aware of. A common criticism of the statistical method is that 
the ability to control for alternative explanations is affected by the researcher’s 
theoretical starting point, a prior knowledge, the availability of data, and the fact that 
all possible relevant effects can not be incorporated into a statistical analysis. Some 
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effects of importance for the phenomena of interest may be excluded from the 
analysis (Grønmo 1996:83, 93, Skog 2005:74). Therefore, statistical method does not 
necessarily provide a deep insight of the studied phenomena, but only a limited 
overview. This problem is reduced by founding the applications of the control 
variables on extensive earlier research on democratic transitions. However, caution in 
generalization of the results is necessary.  
Another challenge facing researchers committed to statistical analysis is the 
confusion of correlation with causation. Statistical modelling reveals correlations, but 
it does not eliminate the uncertainty about causal inferences. This is related to David 
Hume’s asymmetry and contiguity criteria of causal relations (Skog 2005:23-28). A 
cross-sectional study detecting a correlation between the variables X and Y does not 
necessarily reveal which one of the effects comes first, i.e. whether the effect of X 
actually appears before Y. This problem is however reduced in my study by assigning 
the values of the explanatory variables before the values of the dependent variable, 
i.e. the dependent variables are always measured at some future date following the 
installation of democratic government. In addition, the value of the GDP per capita is 
lagged with 5 years.  
It is rather the lack of temporal closeness between X and Y, especially in regard of 
the last two dependent variables, that reduces the likelihood of causality in my study. 
It is possible that the probability of consolidation is affected by other factors of 
greater importance than the mode of transition, when the time frame between the 
installation of democratic government and the future level of democracy becomes 
long20. However, since no democracy becomes consolidated over night, I argue that it 
is precisely the long-term effect of the mode of transition that is of interest. Neither is 
it unreasonable to assume that the possible further democratization follows the same 
mode of transition after the first elections. And as noticed in the previous section, the 
definition of the mode of transition in the units categorized by Huntington is probably 
                                              
20 See for example Peru, Honduras, and Nicaragua in Table 3.4.1. 
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based on longer periods of time than until the installation of first democratic 
government. In addition, to shorten the time frame between the variables, I have 
adjusted the operationalization of the ‘sipneighbour’ variable when analyzing the 
future level of democracy. This is explained in greater detail in section 3.5.  
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4 The Findings  
In this chapter I present the results of the empirical analyses, and examine whether 
the hypotheses introduced in section 2.2.1 are supported by the findings. In section 
4.1 I study the relation between the mode of transition and the probability of 
authoritarian regression; whether hypotheses 1 to 3 and 5 are supported by the results. 
In section 4.2, I examine hypotheses 4 and 6; the relation between the mode of 
transition and the probability of further democratic change. In section 4.3, I examine 
hypotheses 7 on whether extrications are related to the highest probability of 
consolidation. Finally, I discuss the results of the analysis and test the robustness of 
the models.  
4.1 Authoritarian Regression 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are based on O’Donnell’s (1992:19) claim that in cases of defeat 
authoritarian regression is more likely to occur through a “sudden death”, via a 
classic military coup, while after transactions the regression is more likely to occur 
through a “slow death”, through a gradual diminution of the democratic system. In 
my study there are 26 cases of transitions followed by authoritarian regression (see 
Table 3.5). Table 4.1, based on a data set on coup d’états by Marshall and Marshall 
(2008), locates these 26 instances in the subsets of mode of transition and mode of 
regression. Table 4.1 shows that countries have returned to authoritarian system 
through a coup d’état in 17 out of 26 cases of regression. In addition, there has been 
three attempted coups and one alleged coup plot resulting in civil war, and one 
attempted coup resulting to a transitional period. This indicates that coup d’état has 
been the most common way of regression in the time period of 1970-2007. The table 
also shows that coups d’état have occurred eight times after transactions, five times 
after defeats, and in all the three cases of extrication leading to regression. When it 
comes to the so called “slow death”, it appears to have occurred in Peru and in Haiti 
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(after the US invasion). The countries’ ‘sip2’ and ‘polity’ values reduced gradually 
until the subversion by the ruling executive in Haiti in 1999, and until the new 
transitional period in Peru in 2000 (Table 3.3). It is possible that also the regression in 
Bangladesh in 2007 should be categorized as a slow death, although the county’s 
polity score does not reduce gradually. Hypotheses 1 and 2 are not supported by these 
empirical findings; the mode of transition does not have any noticeable effect on how 
the authoritarian regression takes place.  
 
Table 4.1 Authoritarian Regressions and Coup d’ État 
 Transaction Defeat Extrication 
Coup d’état Argentina, Burkina Faso, 
Sierra Leone, Ghana (*2), 
Nigeria, Pakistan (*2) 
Haiti, Thailand (*3), 
Uganda (also civil war), 
Sudan 
Niger, Congo, 
Nepal 
Other Lesotho (civil war)   
Guinea Bissau (attempted 
coup/civil war) 
Fiji (attempted coup / 
transitional period)  
Guinea (elections 
postponed due to a 
worsened security 
situation)  
Peru (president Fujimori 
announced his resignation/ 
transitional period) 
Comoros (attempted 
coup/civil war)  
Cote d’Ivoire (alleged 
coup plot/civil war) 
Haiti (subversion by the 
ruling executive) 
Bangladesh (elections 
cancelled) 
 
Source: Marshall and Marshall (2008), Keesing’s Record of World Events (2008).  
  
Hypotheses 3 and 5 relate to how the mode of transition affects the probability of 
authoritarian regression. Table 4.2 presents the results of multivariate logistic 
regression analyses with authoritarian regression as the dependent variable. To get an 
impression of how the control variables affect the dependent variable, without the 
variables of interest for the hypotheses, the first model only includes these covariates, 
and thus serves as a control model.  
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Table 4.2 Logistic Regression Analysis with Authoritarian Regression as 
Dependent Variable     
 Model 1-1 Model 1-2 Model 1-3 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Extrication   -2.471*** 
(.888) 
.085 -2.022** 
(.894) 
.132 
Transaction   -.239 
(.655) 
.787 -2.287** 
(1.098) 
.102 
Initial level of 
democracy 
.403 
(.567) 
1.496 1.060 
(.666) 
2.887 -.607 
(.900) 
.545 
Earlier democratic 
experience 
.652 
(.567) 
1.919 .736 
(.624) 
2.088 1.059 
(.687) 
2.884 
GDP per capita -.536** 
(.248) 
.585 -.720** 
(.284) 
.487 -.788** 
(.318) 
.455 
Sipneighbour -2.008* 
(1.083) 
.134 -2.324** 
(1.166) 
.098 -2.152* 
(1.233) 
.116 
Dem * Trans     3.568** 
(1.379) 
35.454 
Constant 2.998* 
(1.547) 
20.052 4.587** 
(1.878) 
98.225 5.612*** 
(2.111) 
273.663 
Observations 78 78 78 
-2 Log likelihood 85.249 73.939 66.352 
Cox & Snell R² .165 .278 .345 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two tailed tests). 
Model 1-1 shows that the results of the control variables measuring the GDP per 
capita and the level of democracy in the neighbouring countries are in accordance 
with the previous findings, as presented in section 3.5. Increase in both GDP per 
capita and the level of democracy in the neighbourhood reduces the probability of 
authoritarian regression, although the effect of the ‘sipneighbour’ is significant only 
at the 10 percent level. However, the effects of the initial level of democracy, and 
prior democratic experience, do not support the results from earlier studies. Neither of 
the effects is significantly different from their base line categories. In addition, the 
coefficients indicate that higher initial level of democracy and earlier democratic 
experience increase the probability of authoritarian regression.    
Model 1-2 includes the core independent variables. The significant coefficient for 
extrication, -2.471, indicates that when moving from defeats to extrications, the odds 
48 
of authoritarian regression decreases. Model 1-2 also shows that there is no 
significant difference between transactions and defeats. As for the control variables, 
the GDP per capita and democratic neighbourhood have roughly the same effects as 
in the control model. In addition, the neighbourhood variable is now significant at the 
5 percent level. According to Model 1-2, Hypothesis 3 can not be rejected; there is no 
systematic difference between defeats and transactions and probability of 
authoritarian regression. The results also support Hypothesis 5; extrications are 
related to the lowest probability of authoritarian regression. 
In Model 1-2 the initial level of democracy and prior democratic experience are still 
non-significant. The fact that earlier democratic experience does not have a 
significant effect on the probability of regression does not surprise me, since I did not 
notice any particular pattern when constructing this variable. However, considering 
the large number of empirical studies demonstrating that consistent democracies are 
more stable political systems than semi-democracies, it is confusing that in my 
analysis the odds of authoritarian regression increases by a factor of 2.89, when 
moving from semi-democracy to coherent democracy, although the correlation is 
slightly non-significant (p=0.111). When collecting the empirical evidence for the 
coding of transitions, I observed that there were particular types of defeats and 
transactions that were not supportive of further consolidation, and which I also 
suspected resulting to a certain level of democracy after the first phase of transition.   
Therefore, I have chosen to test whether there is a statistical interaction between the 
mode of transition and the initial level of democracy. Since the inclusion of the 
interaction variables is caused by the knowledge and information I achieved 
throughout the coding process, I have not generated hypotheses on theoretical 
background for the effects of these variables21. I will discuss possible reasons for the 
effects of the interactions in section 4.5. The discussion will rest on the theoretical 
definitions of the three modes of transition by Huntington and Mainwaring, and on 
                                              
21 I also tested whether there is an interaction between earlier democratic experience and the mode of 
transition, but did not find any significant correlations. 
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the guide lines suggested by O’Donnell (1992:21) in order to advance toward 
consolidation.  
In Model 1-3 the interaction variable between transactions and the initial level of 
democracy is included in the analysis22. A decreasing -2LL and an increasing R² 
indicate an improvement of the model when the interaction variable is included. To 
illustrate the effects, I have calculated the predicted probability of regression for the 
three modes of transition in their respective categories of semi-democracy and 
coherent democracy. To calculate the proportions, I applied the approximate average 
values of GDP per capita (6) and ‘sipneighbour’ (0.4). For the earlier democratic 
experience and the initial level of democracy I applied the baseline values of 0. The 
results are presented in Figure 1.     
 
 
Figure 1. Predicted Probability of Authoritarian Regression 
 
 
                                              
22 I excluded the interaction variable between extrication and the initial level of democracy from this 
first analysis since only three cases of extrication are followed by authoritarian regression (see Table 
3.5). Therefore, when the variable was included, the standard errors for the coefficients became 
extremely large (16142.9). 
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Figure 1, which is based on Model 1-3, illustrates that extrications are related to 
lower probability of regression than defeats. However, compared to Model 1-2, the 
inclusion of the interaction variable slightly reduces the effect of extrication. A 
significant interaction variable changes the interpretation of the coefficients for the 
variables included in the interaction variable (Skog 2005:415). The coefficient for 
transaction (-2.287) now describes the effect of transactions leading to semi-
democracy (i.e. when the democracy variable has the value of 0), compared to defeats 
leading to semi-democracy. Transaction leading to coherent democracy increases the 
probability of regression with 1.3 (-2.287+3.568), compared to defeats leading to 
coherent democracy. Or in other words, the odds of regression increases with 3.6 
(0.102*35.454) when moving from transactions leading to coherent democracy to 
defeats leading to coherent democracy. In accordance, Figure 1 demonstrates that 
authoritarian regression is most common after transactions leading to coherent 
democracy and after defeats leading to semi-democracy, while regression seldom 
occurs after extrications and after transactions leading to semi-democracy.  
The results from Model 1-3 indicate that Hypothesis 3 must be rejected. There is a 
systematic difference between defeats and transactions and the probability of 
authoritarian regression, when controlling for whether the transition leads to semi-
democracy or to coherent democracy. However, Model 1-3 does not provide a clear 
answer to whether it is transactions leading to semi-democracy or extrications that are 
related to the lowest probability of authoritarian regression. However, if one 
disregards the effect of the interaction variable, extrications are clearly related to the 
lowest probability of authoritarian regression, i.e. Hypothesis 5 is supported.  
4.2 The 'Next' Level of Democracy  
Hypotheses 4 and 6 relate to how the mode of transition affects the further transition 
process after the installation of first democratic government. Table 4.3 presents the 
results of linear multivariate regression analyses with the 'polity_next' as the 
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dependent variable. ‘Polity_next’ measures the level of democracy in a country after 
the next regime change following the installation of democratic government.  
Table 4.3 Regression Analysis with Polity_next as Dependent Variable 
 Model 2-1 Model 2-2 Model 2-3 
Extrication  3.515** 
(1.679) 
4.573 
(2.945) 
Transaction  -.325 
(1.523) 
2.915 
(2.210) 
Initial level of 
democracy 
2.708* 
(1.373) 
1.856 
(1.367) 
5.437** 
(2.429) 
Earlier democratic 
experience 
.118 
(1.335) 
.215 
(1.299) 
-.110 
(1.300) 
GDP per capita 2.089*** 
(.555) 
2.215*** 
(.538) 
2.118*** 
(.534) 
Sipneighbour 7.722*** 
(2.488) 
7.736*** 
(2.418) 
7.281*** 
(2.403) 
Dem*Extr   -2.538 
(3.591) 
Dem*Trans   -6.010* 
(3.012) 
Constant -17.382*** 
(3.643) 
-18.667*** 
(3.664) 
-19.504*** 
(3.654) 
Observations 78 78 78 
Adjusted R² .335 .380 .398 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two tailed tests) 
The control model 2-1 shows that increase in both GDP per capita, the level of 
democracy in the neighbourhood, and in the initial level of democracy has a 
significant, positive effect on the obtained level of democracy after the next regime 
change. Model 2-3 includes the interaction variables between the mode of transition 
and the initial level of democracy. However, the interaction variables are nearly non-
significant, and there is only a minor increase in the adjusted R² when these are 
included in the analysis. I tested whether the inclusion of the variables improved the 
model, and found that there was no significant23 change in the predicted variance, i.e. 
                                              
23 p= 0.136 
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change in R square. This indicates that Model 2-2 gives a more precise estimate of 
the correlations between variables than Model 2-3.   
Figure 2, which is based on the variables in Model 2-2 and on the same approximate 
average values for GDP and ‘sipneighbour’ as Figure 1, illustrates how the three 
modes of transition are related to the obtained level of democracy after the next 
regime change following the installation of democratic government.  
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted Values of ‘Polity_next’ 
According to Model 2-2, extrications are related to 3.5 points higher level of 
democracy after the regime change than defeats, while there is no significant 
difference between transactions and defeats with respect to their effect on the 
obtained level of democracy after the next regime change. The effect of the initial 
level of coherent democracy is reduced and becomes non-significant when the 
variables for the mode of transition are included.  Figure 2 illustrates the results from 
Model 2-2; extrications are related to the highest probability of further democratic 
change, i.e. Hypothesis 6 is supported by the results. On the other hand, Hypothesis 4 
is not supported by the results; defeats are not related to higher probability of further 
democratic change after the installation of democratic government than transactions.  
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Table 4.4 presents the results of linear multivariate regression analyses with the 
dependent variable 'polity_change'. ‘Polity_change’ measures the direction and 
magnitude of the next regime change following the installation of democratic 
government. 
Table 4.4 Regression Analysis with Polity_change as Dependent Variable 
 Model 3-1 Model 3-2 Model 3-3 
Extrication 
 
5.949*** 
(1.799) 
10.511*** 
(3.047) 
Transaction 
 
1.805 
(1.632) 
6.810*** 
(2.286) 
Initial level of 
democracy 
-2.737* 
(1.514) 
-3.953*** 
(1.465) 
2.455 
(2.513) 
Earlier democratic 
experience 
-.388 
(1.472) 
-.041 
(1.392) 
-.308 
(1.345) 
GDP per capita 1.655*** 
(.612) 
1.818*** 
(.576) 
1.617*** 
(.553) 
Sipneighbour 5.743** 
(2.743) 
5.357** 
(2.592) 
4.965* 
(2.486) 
Dem*Extr 
  
-7.952** 
(3.716) 
Dem*Trans 
  
-9.313*** 
(3.117) 
Constant -14.702*** 
(4.016) 
-17.637*** 
(3.928) 
-19.315*** 
(3.780) 
Observations 78 78 78 
Adjusted R² .163 .262 .332 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two tailed tests). 
The results from the control model 3-1 show that both GDP per capita and level of 
democracy in the neighbourhood have a significant, positive effect on the direction 
and magnitude of the next regime change following the installation of democratic 
government. The effect of the initial level of coherent democracy is negative, but 
significant only at the 10 percent level. According to Model 3-2, extrications have a 
positive effect on the direction of the next regime change, compared to defeats. The 
magnitude of the effect is an increase of 5.95 in predicted change. There is no 
significant difference between the effects of transactions and defeats. The initial level 
of democracy is now significant at 1 percent level, indicating that the initial level of 
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coherent democracy has a negative effect on the direction of the next regime change 
of 3.95 points. 
In Table 4.4 the effects of extrications and transactions are always compared to the 
effect of defeats. Therefore, the results do not provide an intuitive explanation on 
whether the effects actually lead to positive or negative regime changes. Figure 3, 
which is based on the variables in Model 3-3 and on the same approximate average 
values for GDP and ‘sipneighbour’ as the previous figures, illustrates how the three 
modes of transition are related to the direction and magnitude of the next regime 
change. 
 
 
Figure 3. Predicted Values of ‘Polity_change’ 
In Model 3-3 both interaction variables are significant. The results show that 
extrications leading to semi-democracy have a positive effect of 10.5 points on the 
direction of the next regime change, compared with defeats leading to semi-
democracy. In accordance, Figure 3 shows that while defeats leading to semi-
democracy are related to large negative changes, the effect of extrications leading to 
semi-democracy is positive. Model 3-3 also shows that extrications leading to 
coherent democracy have a positive effect of 2.56 points (10.511-7.952) on the next 
regime change, compared with defeats leading to coherent democracy. This effect is 
however positive only when compared to the effect of defeats, as shown in Figure 3. 
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Model 3-3 also shows that transactions leading to semi-democracy have a positive 
effect on the direction of the next regime change of 6.8 points, compared with defeats 
leading to semi-democracy, while transactions leading to coherent democracy have a 
negative effect of -2.5 (6.81-9.313) points on the next regime change, compared to 
defeats leading to coherent democracy. Figure 3 shows that effect of transactions 
leading semi-democracy is however positive only when compared to the effect of 
defeats. 
Figure 3 demonstrates that only extrications leading to semi-democracy are related to 
further democratic change at the next regime change following the installation of 
democratic government. The significant coefficients in Model 3-3 confirm that 
Hypothesis 6 is supported by the results; extrications are related to the highest 
probability of further democratic change after the installation of democratic 
government. According to Figure 3, transaction leading to semi-democracy is the 
second best alternative with regard to further democratic change, while transactions 
leading to coherent democracy and defeats leading to both semi-democracy and 
coherent democracy are least supportive of further democratic change. Model 3-3 
confirms that Hypothesis 4 is not supported by the results. Defeats are not related to 
higher probability of further democratic change after the installation of democratic 
government than transactions.  
4.3 The Future Level of Democracy 
According to Hypothesis 7, extrications are related to the highest probability of 
democratic consolidation. Table 4.5 presents the results of multivariate regression 
analyses with the 'polity_future' as dependent variable, measuring the obtained level 
of democracy in the Polity IV data set for 200724.   
                                              
24With the exceptions of a new transitional period, civil war, and authoritarian regression. See section 
3.4.3. 
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Since the control variable for prior democratic experience has not been significant in 
any of the previous models, I have chosen to leave it out from the subsequent 
analyses. In addition, I have adjusted the variable measuring the average level of 
democracy in the neighbouring countries. Instead of measuring the average level of 
democracy in the neighbouring countries the year the unit in question experiences the 
installation of democratic government, the ‘sipneighb_next’ measures the level of 
democracy the year the unit in question experiences the next regime change, or in 
other words, the next change following the installation of democratic government 
(explained in section 3.5). 
Table 4.5 Regression Analysis with Polity_future as Dependent Variable 
 Model 4-1 Model 4-2 Model 4-3 
Extrication  4.436** 
(1.842) 
7.915** 
(3.060) 
Transaction  .079 
(1.652) 
5.944** 
(2.298) 
Initial level of 
democracy 
-,453 
(1.472) 
-1.388 
(1.452) 
5.454** 
(2.508) 
GDP per capita 1.813*** 
.637) 
2.057*** 
(.619) 
1.937*** 
(.587) 
Sipneighb_next 10.003*** 
(2.897) 
8.831*** 
(2.815) 
7.566*** 
(2.721) 
Dem*Extr   -6.594* 
(3.767) 
Dem*Trans   -10.907*** 
(3.158) 
Constant -15.560*** 
(3.948) 
-17.354*** 
(3.931) 
-19.475*** 
(3.738) 
Observations 78 78 78 
Adjusted R² .288 .343 .422 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two tailed tests). 
The results from the control model 4-1 show that an increase in both GDP per capita 
and level of democracy in the neighbourhood has a significant, positive effect on the 
future level of democracy. The effect of the initial level of coherent democracy is 
negative, but non-significant. The results from Model 4-2 show that extrications are 
related to 4.4 points higher future level of democracy than defeats, while there is no 
significant difference between the effect of transactions and defeats.  
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To illustrate the effects in Model 4-3, I applied the approximate average values of 
GDP per capita (6) and ‘sipneighb_next’ (0.5). For the initial level of democracy I 
applied the baseline values of 0. The results are presented in Figure 4.     
 
 
Figure 4. Predicted Values of ‘Polity_future’ 
 
In Model 4-3 both interaction variables are significant. The results show that 
extrications leading to the initial level of semi-democracy are related to 7.9 points 
higher future level of democracy than defeats leading to semi-democracy. In the case 
of the initial level of coherent democracy, extrication increases the future level of 
democracy with 1.3 points (7.915-6.594), compared to defeats leading to conerent 
democracy. Figure 4 illustrates that extrications, no matter the initial level of 
democracy, are related to the highest future level of democracy. The results from 
Model 4-3 support Hypothesis 7; extrications are related to the highest probability of 
further democratic consolidation 
According to Model 4-3, transactions leading to semi-democracy are related to 5.9 
points higher future level of democracy than defeats leading to semi-democracy. On 
the other hand, transactions leading to coherent democracy are related to -4.96 points 
(5.944-10.907) lower future level of democracy than defeats leading coherent 
democracy. In accordance with this, Figure 4 demonstrates that transactions leading 
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to coherent democracy and defeats leading to semi-democracy are related to the 
lowest future levels of democracy, which also are negative, while transactions leading 
to semi-democracy and defeats leading to coherent democracy are related to positive 
future levels of democracy. In Model 4-3 also the effect of the initial level of 
democracy is significant at the 5 percent level. And as Figure 4 demonstrates, defeats 
leading to coherent democracy are related to 5.5 points higher future level of 
democracy than defeats leading to semi-democracy.  
Table 4.6 presents the results of logistic regression analyses with consolidation as the 
dependent variable. Consolidation is a dummy transformation of the 'polity_future' 
variable, with a cut-off point of 7. 
Table 4.6 Logistic Regression Analysis with Consolidation as Dependent 
Variable 
 Model 5-1 Model 5-2 Model 5-3 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B) 
Extrication   1.842** 
(.925) 
6.311 3.698** 
(1.754) 
40.351 
Transaction   -.609 
(.818) 
.544 1.777 
(1.466) 
5.910 
Initial level of 
democracy 
-.393 
(.656) 
.675 -1.121 
(.775) 
.326 1.717 
(1.621) 
5.568 
GDP per capita 1.000*** 
(.300) 
2.718 1.289*** 
(.360) 
3.629 1.316*** 
(.390) 
3.727 
Sipneighb_next 4.277*** 
(1.330) 
71.997 5.201*** 
(1.675) 
181.483 5.494*** 
(1.891) 
243.196 
Dem*Extr     -3.119 
(2.126) 
.044 
Dem*Trans     -4.425** 
(1.984) 
.012 
Constant -9.282*** .000 -11.765*** 
(2.752) 
.000 -13.741*** 
(3.198) 
.000 
Observations 78 78 78 
-2 Log likelihood 67.275 58.684 52.541 
Cox & Snell R² .398 .461 .502 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01 (two tailed tests) 
Both Model 5-1 and 5-2 are in accordance with the previous findings. Higher GDP 
per capita, higher level of democracy in the neighbourhood, and a transition through 
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extrication increase the probability of further democratic consolidation. Model 5-2 
shows that the odds of consolidation increases by a factor of 6.3 when moving from 
defeats to extrications, while there is no significant difference between transactions 
and defeats in their effect on consolidation.  
To illustrate the effects, I have calculated the predicted probability of consolidation 
for the three modes of transition in their respective categories of semi-democracy and 
coherent democracy. To calculate the proportions I applied the same approximate 
average values as for Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 5. Predicted Probability of Consolidation 
 
Figure 5 demonstrates that democratic consolidation is most common after 
extrications leading to semi-democracy. However, in Model 5-3 the interaction 
variable between extrications and the initial level of democracy is non-significant, 
while the effect of extrication is significant at the 5 percent level. This implies that 
the estimated odds of consolidation increases by a factor of 40, when moving from 
defeats to extrications. Figure 5 also illustrates that defeats leading to coherent 
democracy and transactions leading to semi-democracy are more supportive of 
consolidation than defeats leading to semi-democracy and transactions leading to 
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coherent democracy. However, Model 5-3 shows that the effect of transaction is non-
significant, thus there is no significant difference between transactions and defeats 
leading to semi-democracy in their effect on consolidation, while transactions leading 
to coherent democracy have a significantly lower probability of consolidation than 
defeats leading to coherent democracy.  
In short, extrications are related to higher probability of consolidation than defeats, 
there is no significant difference between transactions and defeats leading to semi-
democracy, and in cases of coherent democracy, transactions are related to lower 
probability of consolidation than defeats. Thus, the results from Model 5-3 support 
Hypothesis 7; extrications are related to the highest probability of further democratic 
consolidation.   
4.4 Discussion of the Findings 
The results from all the previous analyses support the hypotheses by Huntington 
(1991:276) and Munck (1994:364); the prospects of democratic consolidation are 
enhanced in extrications. In extrications both the authoritarian regime and the 
opposition influence the democratization process relatively equally. It seems that the 
presence of the old elites creates stability, and helps the democratic actors to retain 
and strengthen their strategic alliance against authoritarian forces, while the presence 
of the relatively strong opposition conduces to maintaining and strengthening the 
newly established democratic institutions Subsequently, the threat of authoritarian 
regression is less imminent, the opposition, which has had a great opportunity to 
develop, and to increase in number and intensity throughout the transition process, 
can accomplish the tasks O’Donnell (1992:21) suggested for democratic actors; to 
neutralize authoritarian actors, and to promote democratic preferences and practices 
among the neutral actors. In addition, extrications are usually non-violent and 
characterized by negotiations and compromise on both sides.  
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The question that arises from the findings deals with the puzzle of the different 
effects of defeats and transactions on the two initial levels of democracy. Why is the 
positive effect of defeats on consolidation conditional on the initial level of coherent 
democracy, as demonstrated in Model 4-3? My empirical study of transitions through 
defeat has shown that coups by small military factions, leading to the initial level of 
semi-democracy, such as those in Cote d’Ivoire, Thailand in 1975 and 1978, Ethiopia, 
Comoros, and Cambodia, have not been followed by further democratization, but new 
military coups, or even civil war. Neither have the foreign invasions in Uganda and 
Haiti leading to the initial level of semi-democracy resulted to further 
democratization. In my study the only case of defeat leading to semi-democracy, and 
showing signs of democratic consolidation, is the revolution in Romania.  
What is the difference between the defeat in Romania and the defeats in the other 
countries mentioned? This may be related to the discussion conducted in section 3.3 
regarding whether all kinds of coups should be defined as defeats by 'opposition'. The 
initial level of semi-democracy after a coup may be related to the fact that the balance 
of power does not yet favour opposition to authoritarianism. When a small military 
faction manages to overthrow the government, with relatively weak popular support, 
the number of strictly democratic actors in a country is low, and the number of 
authoritarian or at least neutral actors is high. As a consequence, it may become 
impossible for the few democratic actors to accomplish the tasks suggested by 
O’Donnell (1992:21) to advance toward consolidation; to neutralize authoritarian 
actors, to promote democratic preferences and practices among the neutral actors, and 
thus to increase in number and intensity.  
On the other hand, a defeat leading to the initial level of coherent democracy may 
indicate that the balance of power between the old and the new elites has clearly 
changed, and the opposition to authoritarianism has become the strongest group. For 
example, the defeat in Portugal in 1974 resulted in a ‘sip2’ level of 0.905, which is 
defined as a coherent democracy in my study. The efficient coup was carried out by a 
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group of young officers leading the Movimento das Forcas Armadas. The coup 
attained huge popular support with crowds flooding the streets, cheering the soldiers, 
and placing carnations in the barrels of the rifles. This indicates that the number of 
democratic actors was high, while the number of neutral and authoritarian actors was 
low already in time of the coup. Subsequently, the tasks of democratic actors are 
easier to carry through, or are actually already partly accomplished. Examples of 
other transitions located in this category, and showing positive results with regard to 
consolidation, are Argentina, Mali, Philippines, Indonesia, and the US invasion in 
Panama. 
The results of the regression analyses confirmed that transactions leading to the initial 
level of semi-democracy are related to higher probability of consolidation than 
defeats leading to semi-democracy, while transactions leading to coherent democracy 
are related to lower probability of consolidation than defeats leading coherent 
democracy, i.e. the significant correlations are contingent on a comparison of the 
effects of defeats and transactions. However, to simplify the following discussion, I 
assume that in cases of transactions, the initial level of semi-democracy is related to 
higher probability of further democratization than the initial level of coherent 
democracy, as illustrated in the figures 4 and 5.  
As noticed in section 2.2.1, in transactions there are continuities in procedures, 
institutions, and individuals connected with the previous regime, and the memory of 
the authoritarian regime may be less negative among parts of the population. It is 
possible that a transition though transaction leading to the initial level of coherent 
democracy is too sudden and extensive both for the old elites, and for parts of the 
population to adjust to, and to accept. Another closely related problem concerns the 
role of opposition in transactions. The impression I attained from my empirical study 
of the transactions leading to coherent democracy, such as Guinea Bissau, Burkina 
Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Central African Republic, and Lesotho, was that the role of 
opposition in the transition process was minor, or even non-existing. However, the 
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influence from the opposition is of importance also in transactions, although it is the 
ancient regime that decides the speed and the progress of the transition (Huntington 
1991:139). It is possible that if the old regime suddenly carries through an extensive 
democratization, where the influence of the opposition is minor, the number of 
strictly democratic actors remains low, while the number of authoritarian and neutral 
actors is high. Subsequently, the democratic actors’ possibilities to neutralize 
authoritarian actors, to promote democratic preferences and practices among the 
numerous neutral actors, and to increase in number are restricted.  
On the other hand, when transactions lead to the initial level of semi-democracy, the 
democratization is more cautious and gradual, and the old authoritarian elites and the 
neutral parts of the population have more time for adjusting to and accepting the new 
system.  In addition, the opposition to the authoritarian system has better chance to 
develop, to increase in number and intensity, to neutralize authoritarian actors, and to 
promote further democratic change. For example, Ghana has experienced three 
transitions all following the pattern of transaction in the time period of 1970-1992. 
The first two transitions resulted to the initial level of coherent democracy, but both 
were after a relatively short time period followed by authoritarian regression through 
a military coup. In contrast, the last transition resulted to the initial level of semi-
democracy, and the country is finally showing signs of not returning to 
authoritarianism, since the level of democracy has gradually become stronger (see 
Table 3.3). Another examples of transactions located in this category, and showing 
positive results with regard to consolidation, are Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Albania, and Taiwan. 
4.5 The Robustness of the Models 
The log-likelihood values in logistic regression analysis describe whether the models 
are improved when new explanatory variables included in the analysis. The results 
from the analyses with the dependent variables ‘regression’ (Model 1-1 to 1-3) and 
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‘consolidation’ (Model 5-1 to 5-3) show that that the -2LL values decrease, which 
implies that the models are improved when the new explanatory variables are 
included. The Cox & Snell R square measures the same aspect by showing how much 
the log-likelihood values are reduced when the new explanatory variables are 
included. In both analyses the R2 increases, which indicates that the models are 
improved (Christophersen 2006:208).  
Omnibus tests of the model coefficients show whether the inclusion of the new 
explanatory variables lead to a significant improvement of the model (Christophersen 
2006:206). The results showed that the models where the dummy variables for the 
mode of transition were included were significantly better to predict respectively 
‘regression’ and ‘consolidation’ than the models with only the control variables. Also 
the models where the interaction variable(s) were included were significantly better 
to predict the dependent variables than the model without the interaction variable(s). 
The p-vales were always below the 5 percent level. Hosmer and Lemeshow tests of 
the models where the interaction variables were included generated p-values above 
the 10 percent level. This indicates that since the discrepancy between the predicted 
and observed frequencies is non-significant, the models with the interaction variables 
can not be rejected. 
To interpret results from a linear regression analysis, the dependent variables must be 
measured at least at the interval level (Christophersen 2006:175). The dependent 
variables polity_next, and polity_future are categorized on a scale ranging from -10 
to 10, while polity_change varies between -18 and 7 (see appendix 3). The variables 
are constructed as additive indexes where the unit’s value is a summation of 
autocracy (-) and democracy (+) points from five indicators measuring different 
institutional aspects of regimes. These variables can not be characterized as 
continuous, but they are relatively fine-graded, and it is it is possible to measure the 
distance between the categories. Therefore, I regard the measurement level of the 
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variables sufficient for them to qualify as dependent variables in the linear regression 
analyses.  
I tested whether the changes in the predicted variance, i.e. changes in the R square, 
were significant when the dummy variables for the mode of transition and the 
interaction variables were included in the analyses. The results showed that the 
inclusion of the variables significantly improved the models, with the exception of 
the analysis of the dependent variable ‘polity_next’. The inclusion of the interaction 
variables resulted to a non-significant change in the predicted variance, as noticed in 
section 4.2. Beyond that, the changes in the predicted variance were always 
significant at last at the 5 percent level.  
Linear regression analysis requires that the distribution of the residuals is symmetric 
along a horizontal line and follows the curve of the standard normal distribution 
(Skog 2005:236). I have tested whether these conditions are fulfilled, and found some 
discrepancy from the normal distribution curve, while the scatter plots indicated a 
relatively symmetric distribution of the residuals. Linear regression analysis also 
requires that the explanatory variables are not correlated. In my study 
multicolinearity, which means that one explanatory variable is a linear combination 
of two or several of the other explanatory variables (Christophersen 2006:180), 
reduces the robustness of the models where the interaction variables are included. 
The tolerance values approach 0.2 and the VIF values approach 5, indicating 
multicolinearity. However, I have chosen to interpret the results from the models with 
the interaction variables, since the multicolinearity is caused by the fact that I have 
relatively few units, and when measuring interaction, the variables are multiplied 
with each other.      
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5 Conclusion 
This thesis has explored the question of how does the mode of democratic transition 
affect the probability of further democratic consolidation. The main explanatory 
variable is a democratic transition resulting to the installation of the first 
democratically elected government or chief executive in the time period of 1970-
2000, categorized as transaction, extrication, or defeat. The continued transition 
process after this first phase of transition is studied by using both linear and logistic 
regression analysis of cross-sectional country data with 78 units. In order to obtain a 
valid and adequate prediction of the probability of further consolidation, I construct 
five dependent variables, all measuring different aspects of how the transition process 
continues further after the installation of democratic government. 
When testing the hypotheses concerning how the mode of transition is related to the 
probability of authoritarian regression, I find that Coup d’état has been the most 
common way of regression in the time period of 1970-2007. The results indicate that 
the mode of transition does not have any noticeable effect on how the authoritarian 
regression takes place. The logistic regression analyses with authoritarian regression 
as the dependent variable showed that extrications are related to lower probability of 
regression than defeats. I also tested whether there was an interaction between the 
mode of transition and the level of democracy obtained right after the installation of 
the first democratic government, which I refer to as the initial level of democracy. I 
find that authoritarian regression is most common after transactions leading to 
coherent democracy and after defeats leading to semi-democracy, while regression 
seldom occurs after extrications and after transactions leading to semi-democracy. 
The analysis with the interaction variable did not provide a clear answer to whether it 
is transactions leading to semi-democracy or extrications that are related to the lowest 
probability of authoritarian regression. However, if one disregards the effect of the 
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interaction, extrications are clearly related to the lowest probability of authoritarian 
regression. 
When testing the hypotheses concerning the probability of further democratic change, 
I find that extrications are related to significantly higher level of democracy after the 
next regime change following the installation of first democratic government than 
defeats, while there is no significant difference between transactions and defeats with 
respect to their effect on the ‘next’ level of democracy. I also found that only 
extrications leading to semi-democracy are related to further positive democratic 
change following the installation of democratic government. Transaction leading to 
semi-democracy is the second best alternative with regard to further democratic 
change, while transactions leading to coherent democracy and defeats leading to both 
semi-democracy and coherent democracy are least supportive of further democratic 
change. In short, extrications are related to the highest probability of further 
democratic change. 
When testing the hypotheses concerning the future level of democracy, which I refer 
to as the probability of consolidation, I find that extrications, no matter the initial 
level of democracy, are related to the highest future level of democracy. Transactions 
leading to coherent democracy and defeats leading to semi-democracy are related to 
the lowest future levels of democracy, which also are negative, while transactions 
leading to semi-democracy and defeats leading to coherent democracy are the second 
best alternatives after extrications. I also found that defeats leading to coherent 
democracy are related to significantly higher future level of democracy than defeats 
leading to semi-democracy. The logistic regression analyses with ‘consolidation’ as 
the dependent variable showed that extrications are related to higher probability of 
consolidation than defeats, there is no significant difference between transactions and 
defeats leading to semi-democracy, and transactions leading to coherent democracy 
are related to lower probability of consolidation than defeats leading to coherent 
democracy.  
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The results from all the five analyses supported the hypotheses by Huntington 
(1991:276) and Munck (1994:364); extrications are related to the highest probability 
of democratic consolidation. All the analyses also indicate that transactions leading to 
semi-democracy and defeats leading to coherent democracy are more supportive of 
consolidation than transactions leading to coherent democracy and defeats leading to 
semi-democracy. The effects of the control variables supported the results from 
earlier studies; higher GDP per capita and higher level of democracy in the 
neighbouring countries increases the probability of democratic consolidation. 
When discussing the findings, I argue that in extrications the balanced power between 
the old regime and the opposition restrains a possible authoritarian regression; the 
presence of the opposition is conducive to maintaining and strengthening the newly 
established democratic institutions, while the presence of the old elites encourages the 
opposition to develop, to strengthen, and to promote further democratic change. I also 
argue that when a defeat of an authoritarian regime takes place through a military 
coup leading to the initial level of semi-democracy, the number of democratic actors 
in the country is still low and the number of authoritarian or at least neutral actors is 
high. Subsequently, the balance of power does not necessarily favour opposition to 
authoritarianism, which complicates the further democratization process.  
On the other hand, when a transaction leads to coherent democracy, the change may 
be too sudden and extensive both for parts of the old elites, and parts of the 
population to adjust to, and to accept. A related problem concerns the role of the 
opposition in the transition process. If the authoritarian regime carries through an 
extensive democratization, where the influence of the opposition is minor, the 
number of strictly democratic actors remains low, while the number of authoritarian 
and neutral actors is high. This reduces the democratic actors’ possibilities to 
neutralize the authoritarian actors and to promote further democratic change. When 
the transition is more gradual and cautious leading first to semi-democracy, the 
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opposition groups have better possibilities to develop, and to influence the 
democratization process.  
I am tempted to return to the example of democratization in Mauritania presented in 
the introduction. If the selection of my units was not restricted to the year 2000, the 
transition would qualify as a unit in my inquiry. The events would clearly be 
categorized as a defeat of the authoritarian regime through a military coup in 2005, 
with the following transitional period until 2007. The obtained polity-score in the 
Polity IV data set is 4, which would be defined as the initial level of semi-democracy 
in my study. The results from study show that defeats leading to semi-democracy are 
related to a predicted probability of authoritarian regression of 0.5, and a predicted 
probability of democratic consolidation of 0.04 (see figures 1 and 5). Unfortunately, 
the continued transition process in Mauritania, with new military coup in August 
2008, followed the predicted pattern in my study. 
In the course of this study it has become clear to me that further (quantitative) studies 
are needed in order to answer two important questions. Why do democratic 
transitions take place? And why some democratic transitions are successful, while 
others are followed by return to authoritarianism? I have three proposals for 
improvements in the research design for further studies of the probability of 
consolidation. First, concerning both the theoretical background and the actual 
operationalization, it should be more clearly specified which democratic transition 
qualify as units in the analysis, and thus can be categorized after the mode of 
transition. Second, the coding criteria should be precised and developed further. And 
third, the dependent variable should also take into account the duration of the 
democratic structures. These measurements would increase the validity of the 
research design and be conducive to possible generalizations of the results. 
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Appendices  
Appendix 1: List of Units 
 Ssno Country Polity Start 
Date  
Event Mode of 
Transition 
1 41 Haiti 01.01.91 Presidential elections Defeat (people 
power) 
2 41 Haiti 16.10.94 Aristide returned from exile Defeat 
3 42 Dominican 
Republic 
17.08.78 President takes office Extrication 
4 70 Mexico 01.07.82 Presidential elections Transaction 
5 90 Guatemala 15.01.86 President takes office Transaction 
6 91 Honduras 28.01.82 President takes office Extrication 
7 92 El Salvador 02.06.84 President takes office Extrication 
8 93 Nicaragua 01.07.84 Presidential and legislative elections in 
November 1984 
Extrication 
9 95 Panama 20.12.89 President installed Defeat 
10 110 Guyana 06.10.92 Presidential and legislative elections Extrication 
11 130 Ecuador 30.04.79 Presidential and congressional elections Transaction 
12 135 Peru 29.07.80 President takes office Transaction 
13 140 Brazil 16.01.85 Presidential elections Transaction 
14 145 Bolivia 11.10.82 President and cabinet takes office Extrication 
15 150 Paraguay 02.05.89 Presidential and congressional elections  Transaction 
16 155 Chile 16.12.89 Presidential elections Transaction 
17 160 Argentina 12.03.73 Presidential and legislative elections Transaction 
18 160 Argentina 31.10.83 Presidential and legislative elections Defeat 
19 165 Uruguay 02.03.85 Government takes office Extrication 
20 230 Spain 30.12.78 New constitution (Legislative elections  
in June 1977) 
Transaction 
21 235 Portugal 26.04.76 New constitution (Legislative elections 
in April 1975) 
Defeat 
22 290 Poland 01.07.91 New electoral draft law Extrication 
23 310 Hungary 01.07.90 Legislative elections in March 1990 Transaction 
24 315 Czechoslovakia 09.06.90 Legislative elections Extrication 
25 339 Albania 14.04.91 Legislative elections Transaction 
26 345 Yugoslavia 24.11.00 Legislative elections in December 2000 Defeat (people 
power) 
76 
27 350 Greece 08.06.75 New constitution (Legislative elections 
in Nov. 1974) 
Defeat 
28 355 Bulgaria 21.06.90 Legislative elections Transaction 
29 360 Romania 21.06.90 Presidential and legislative elections Defeat (people 
power) 
30 365 Russia 23.08.91 Decree of Aug. 23 transferred all union 
enterprises and natural resources on 
RSFSR territory to RSFSR jurisdiction   
Transaction 
31 404 Guinea Bissau 04.07.94 Presidential and legislative elections Transaction 
32 420 Gambia 01.07.97 Presidential elections in Sept. 1996, 
legislative elections in Jan. 97 
Transaction 
33 432 Mali 09.06.92 President takes office Defeat (people 
power) 
34 434 Benin 25.03.91 Presidential elections Extrication 
35 435 Mauritania 01.07.92 Presidential elections in Jan. 1992, 
legislative elections in March 1992 
Transaction 
36 436 Niger 27.12.92 New constitution (Presidential and 
legislative elections in Feb. 1993) 
Extrication 
37 437 Cote d'Ivoire 26.10.00 President takes office Defeat 
38 438 Guinea 01.07.95 Legislative elections in June 1995 Transaction 
39 439 Burkina Faso 30.05.78 Presidential Elections Transaction 
40 451  Sierra Leone 27.02.96 Legislative elections Transaction 
41 452 Ghana 01.09.70 Legislative elections Transaction 
42 452 Ghana 01.01.79 Day political parties became legal. 
(Legislative and presidential elections in 
June 1979) 
Transaction 
43 452 Ghana 04.11.92 Presidential elections Transaction 
44 475 Nigeria 02.10.79 President takes office Transaction 
45 475 Nigeria 29.04.99 President takes office Transaction 
46 481 Gabon 01.07.93 Legislative elections in Oct. 1990, 
presidential elections in Dec. 1993 
Extrication 
47 482 Central African 
Republic 
23.08.93 Legislative and presidential elections Transaction 
48 484 Congo 16.03.92 New constitution (Legislative elections 
in June 1992, presidential elections in 
August 1992) 
Extrication 
49 500 Uganda 16.12.80 President takes office Defeat 
50 500 Uganda 09.05.96 Presidential elections Transaction 
51 501 Kenya 01.07.92 Legislative elections in December 1992 Extrication 
52 510 Tanzania 01.07.95 Legislative elections in October 1995 Transaction 
53 530 Ethiopia 09.12.94 New constitution (Legislative elections 
in May 1995) 
Defeat 
54 541 Mozambique 28.10.94 Presidential and legislative elections Extrication 
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55 551 Zambia 01.11.91 Presidential and legislative elections Extrication 
56 553 Malawi 18.05.94 Presidential and legislative elections  Extrication 
57 560 South Africa 27.04.94 Legislative elections Extrication 
58 570 Lesotho 28.03.93 Legislative elections Transaction 
59 580  Madagascar 26.11.92 Presidential elections Extrication 
60 581 Comoros 21.03.90 President takes office Defeat 
61 583 Chad 01.07.96 Presidential elections in July 1996 Extrication 
62 615 Algeria 01.07.95 Presidential elections in November 1995 Transaction 
63 625 Sudan 02.04.86 Legislative elections Defeat 
64 640 Turkey 07.11.83 Legislative elections Transaction 
65 712 Mongolia 30.07.90 Legislative election Extrication 
66 713 Taiwan 20.12.92 Legislative elections Transaction 
67 732 Korea 26.02.88 President takes office Extrication 
68 770 Pakistan 01.01.73 New constitution Transaction 
69 770 Pakistan 17.11.88 Legislative elections Transaction 
70 771 Bangladesh 26.09.91 New constitution (Legislative elections 
in Feb. 1991) 
Defeat (people 
power) 
71 790 Nepal 01.07.91 Legislative elections in May 1991 Extrication  
72 800 Thailand 01.07.75 Legislative elections in January 1975 Defeat 
73 800 Thailand 19.12.78 New constitution (Legislative elections 
in April 1979) 
Defeat 
74 800 Thailand 14.09.92 Legislative elections Defeat 
75 811 Cambodia 05.08.98 Legislative elections Defeat 
76 840 Philippines 03.02.87 New constitution Defeat (people 
power) 
77 850 Indonesia 21.10.99 President takes office Defeat (people 
power) 
78 950 Fiji 01.07.92 New constitution (Legislative elections 
in May 1992) 
Transaction 
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Appendix 2: Sources for Coding 
Keesing's Record of World Events (formerly Keesing's Contemporary Archives) 
-URL: http://www.keesings.com/keesings_record_of_world_events 
Ssno Country References 
41 Haiti Volume 35, April 1989, Page 36586. Volume 36, January 1990, Page 
37182.Volume 36, March 1990, Page 37313. Volume 36, August 1990, Page 
37649.Volume 36, December 1990, Page 37911. Volume 37, February 1991, Page 
37999. 
41  Haiti Volume 40, September 1994, Page 40174. Volume 40, October 1994, Page 40222. 
42 Dominican 
Republic 
Volume 23, June 1977, Page 28392. Volume 24, January 1978, Page 28772. 
Volume 24, September 1978, Page 29199. 
70 Mexico Volume 28, January 1982, Page 31266. Volume 28, October 1982, Page 31730. 
Huntington (1991:113)   
90 Guatemala Volume 29, November 1983, Page 32494. Volume 30, July 1984, Page 32972. 
Volume 31, January 1985, Page 33330. Volume 32, April 1986, Page 34285. 
Huntington (1991:113) 
91 Honduras Volume 24, June 1978, Page 29036. Volume 26, September 1980, Page 30483. 
Volume 26, November 1980, Page 30570. Volume 28, April 1982, Page 31407. 
Huntington (1991:113) 
92 El Salvador Volume 27, January 1981, Page 30685. Volume 28, July 1982, Page 31613. 
Volume 30, May 1984, Page 32853. Volume 30, November 1984, Page 33204. 
Huntington (1991:113) 
93 Nicaragua Volume 30, May 1984, Page 32846. Volume 30, December 1984, Page 33269. 
Huntington (1991:113) 
95 Panama Volume 35, May 1989, Page 36645. Volume 35, August 1989, Page 36846. 
Volume 35, December 1989, Page 37112.  
110 Guyana Volume 37, April 1991, Page 38142. Volume 38, October 1992, Page 39137. 
130 Ecuador Volume 22, October 1976, Page 27969. Volume 22, December 1976, Page 
28100.Volume 23, March 1977, Page 28235. Volume 25, July 1979, Page 29729. 
Volume 24, January 1978, Page 28751. Volume 24, April 1978, Page 28951. 
Volume 23, October 1977, Page 28602. Huntington (1991:113) 
135 Peru Volume 22, April 1976, Page 27660. Volume 23, March 1977, Page 28239. 
Volume 23, September 1977, Page 28547. Volume 24, March 1978, Page 28877. 
Volume 24, September 1978, Page 29202. Volume 26, January 1980, Page 30022. 
Volume 26, October 1980, Page 30545. Huntington (1991:113) 
140 Brazil Volume 27, July 1981, Page 30981. Volume 31, June 1985, Page 33645. Volume 
30, July 1984, Page 32961. Volume 31, June 1985, Page 33642. Volume 29, 
February 1983, Page 31939. Huntington (1991:113) 
145 Bolivia Volume 27, October 1981, Page 31123. Volume 29, February 1983, Page 31942. 
Huntington (1991:113) 
150 Paraguay Volume 35, February 1989, Page 36458. Volume 35, May 1989, Page 36652. 
155 Chile Volume 34, December 1988, Page 36344. Volume 35, February 1989, Page 36460. 
Volume 35, April 1989, Page 36584. Volume 35, July 1989, Page 36811. Volume 
35, August 1989, Page 36845. Volume 35, December 1989, Page 37117. 
79 
Huntington (1991:113) 
160 Argentina Volume 17, September 1971, Page 24803. Volume 17, September 1971, Page 
24805. Volume 17, December 1971, Page 24977. Volume 19, April 1973, Page 
25840. Volume 19, January 1973, Argentina, Page 25702. Volume 19, January 
1973, Page 25701. 
160 Argentina Volume 28, February 1982, Page 31338. Volume 28, November 1982, Page 31805. 
Volume 29, December 1983, Page 32553. Volume 29, April 1983, Page 32064. 
Huntington (1991:113) 
165 Uruguay Volume 27, March 1981, Page 30744.Volume 27, December 1981, Page 31227. 
Volume 29, June 1983, Page 32184. Volume 30, January 1984, Page 32618. 
Volume 30, June 1984, Page 32907. Volume 30, October 1984, Page 33141. 
Volume 31, April 1985, Page 33515. Huntington (1991:113) 
230 Spain Volume 22, July 1976, Page 27853. Volume 23, August 1977, Page 28517. Volume 
22, December 1976, Page 28085. Volume 23, May 1977, Page 28325. Volume 23, 
May 1977, Page 28327. Volume 23, June 1977, Page 28373. Volume 22, July 1976, 
Page 27855. Huntington (1991:113) 
235 Portugal Volume 20, January 1974, Page 26687. Volume 20, April 1974, Page 26485. 
Volume 20, May 1974, Page 26517. Volume 21, March 1975, Page 27005. Volume 
21, June 1975, Page 27155. Huntington (1991:113)   
290 Poland Volume 34, January 1988, Page 35653. Volume 34, November 1988, Page 
36297.Volume 34, November 1988, Page 36299. Volume 35, January 1989, Page 
36400. Volume 34, January 1988, Page 35651. Volume 35, February 1989, Page 
36469. Huntington (1991:113) 
310 Hungary Volume 34, September 1988, Page 36164. Volume 35, January 1989, Page 36399. 
Volume 35, February 1989, Page 36468. Volume 35, June 1989, Page 36746. 
Volume 35, October 1989, Page 36960. Volume 36, March 1990, Page 37325. 
Huntington (1991:113) 
315 Czechoslovakia Huntington (1991:113). 
339 Albania Volume 36, January 1990, Page 37195. Volume 36, April 1990, Page 37385. 
Volume 37, April 1991, Page 38160. Volume 36, July 1990, Page 37618. Volume 
36, November 1990, Page 37864. Volume 36, December 1990, Page 37924. 
Volume 36, May 1990, Page 37463. 
345 Yugoslavia Volume 46, July 2000, Page 43684. Volume 46, August 2000, Page 43715. Volume 
46, September 2000, Page 43766. Volume 46, October 2000, Page 43805. Volume 
46, November 2000, Page 43874. Volume 46, December 2000, Page 43922.  
350 Greece Volume 20, October 1974, Page 26781. Volume 20, February 1974, Page 26325. 
Volume 20, February 1974, Page 26327. Volume 21, January 1975, Page 26893. 
Huntington (1991:113) 
355 Bulgaria Volume 35, October 1989, Page 36980. Volume 35, November 1989, Page 37027. 
Volume 35, December 1989, Page 37109. Volume 36, January 1990, Page 37192. 
Volume 36, February 1990, Page 37253. Volume 36, March 1990, Page 37328. 
Volume 36, April 1990, Page 37380. Volume 36, June 1990, Page 37542. 
Huntington (1991:113) 
360 Romania Volume 34, April 1988, Page 35845. Volume 35, March 1989, Page 36534. 
Volume 35, December 1989, Page 37104. Volume 36, February 1990, Page 37251. 
Volume 36, March 1990, Page 37327. Volume 36, May 1990, Page 37441. 
Huntington (1991:113) 
365 Russia Huntington (1991:113). 
404 Guinea Bissau Volume 37, January 1991, Page 37948. Volume 37, December 1991, Page 38665. 
80 
Volume 38, July 1992, Page 38993. Volume 39, May 1993, Page 39452. Volume 
38, March 1992, Page 38802. Volume 40, August 1994, Page 40130. 
420 Gambia Volume 41, December 1995, Page 40857. Volume 42, July 1996, Page 41177. 
Volume 42, August 1996, Page 41216. Volume 42, September 1996, Page 41258. 
Volume 42, November 1996, Page 41355.  Volume 43, January 1997, Page 41434. 
Volume 43, March 1997, Page 41529. Volume 43, April 1997, Page 41579.  
432 Mali Volume 37, January 1991, Page 37947. Volume 37, February 1991, Page 37995. 
Volume 37, March 1991, Page 38083. Volume 37, April 1991, Page 38134. 
Volume 38, June 1992, Page 38951. Volume 38, March 1992, Page 38801. Volume 
38, April 1992, Page 38853. Volume 37, July 1991, Page 38324. 
434 Benin Volume 35, December 1989, Page 37115. Volume 36, February 1990, Page 37238. 
Volume 36, March 1990, Page 37308. Volume 37, March 1991, Page 38084. 
Bratton and de Walle (1997:165) 
435 Mauritania Volume 37, April 1991, Page 38135. Volume 37, July 1991, Page 38325. Volume 
37, September 1991, Page 38425. Volume 37, October 1991, Page 38518. Volume 
37, November 1991, Page 38565. Volume 38, January 1992, Page 38709. Volume 
38, February 1992, Page 38756. Volume 38, March 1992, Page 38802. Volume 38, 
April 1992, Page 38853.  
436 Niger Volume 36, November 1990, Page 37841. Volume 37, March 1991, Page 38085. 
Volume 37, July 1991, Page 38325. Volume 37, August 1991, Page 38379. Volume 
37, September 1991, Page 38425. Volume 37, October 1991, Page 38520. Volume 
38, December 1992, Page 39228. Volume 39, February 1993, Page 39306. Volume 
39, March 1993, Page 39354. Bratton and de Walle (1997:165) 
437 Cote d'Ivoire Volume 45, May 1999, Page 42929. Volume 45, December 1999, Page 43301. 
Volume 46, January 2000, Page 43344. Volume 46, July 2000, Page 43661. 
Volume 46, September 2000, Page 43736. Volume 46, October 2000, Page 43780. 
Volume 45, November 1999, Page 43244. 
438 Guinea Volume 38, October 1992, Page 39134. Volume 39, September 1993, Page 39626. 
Volume 39, October 1993, Page 39674. Volume 39, December 1993, Page 39767.  
439 Burkina Faso Volume 23, February 1977, Page 28218. Volume 24, July 1978, Page 29096. 
Volume 24, January 1978, Page 28788. 
451  Sierra Leone Volume 41, January 1995, Page 40346. Volume 41, March 1995, Page 40443. 
Volume 41, April 1995, Page 40491. Volume 41, October 1995, Page 40759. 
Volume 41, December 1995, Page 40858. Volume 42, January 1996, Page 40887. 
Volume 42, February 1996, Page 40934. Volume 42, March 1996, Page 40982.  
452 Ghana Volume 14, November 1968, Page 23058. Volume 15, September 1969, Page 
23545. Volume 15, May 1969, Page 23351.  
452 Ghana Volume 23, June 1977, Page 28393. Volume 23, July 1977, Page 28468. Volume 
23, August 1977, Page 28524. Volume 24, December 1978, Page 29333. 
452 Ghana Volume 37, June 1991, Page 38279. Volume 38, December 1992, Page 39228. 
Volume 37, August 1991, Page 38379. Volume 38, March 1992, Page 38802. 
Volume 38, May 1992, Page 38899. Volume 38, September 1992, Page 39084. 
Volume 38, October 1992, Page 39131. Volume 38, November 1992, Page 39180. 
Volume 37, July 1991, Page 38326. 
475 Nigeria Volume 22, December 1976, Page 28089. Volume 23, October 1977, Page 28628. 
Volume 23, April 1977, Page 28308. Huntington (1991:113) 
Nigeria: Politics, government, and taxation. -URL: 
http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Africa/Nigeria-POLITICS-
GOVERNMENT-AND-TAXATION.html 
475 Nigeria Volume 44, April 1998, Page 42172. Volume 44, May 1998, Page 42257. Volume 
81 
44, June 1998, Page 42321. Volume 44, July 1998, Page 42380. Volume 44, 
September 1998, Page 42479. Volume 45, February 1999, Page 42764. Volume 45, 
May 1999, Page 42924. Volume 45, June 1999, Page 42984. 
481 Gabon Volume 36, May 1990, Page 37444. Volume 36, September 1990, Page 37701. 
Volume 36, October 1990, Page 37767. Volume 36, November 1990, Page 37841. 
Volume 37, June 1991, Page 38277. Volume 38, February 1992, Page 38755. 
Volume 39, December 1993, Page 39767.  
482 Central African 
Republic 
Volume 39, October 1993, Page 39673. Volume 39, September 1993, Page 39624. 
Volume 39, August 1993, Page 39583. Volume 39, June 1993, Page 39495. 
Volume 39, May 1993, Page 39448. Volume 39, February 1993, Page 39305. 
Volume 38, October 1992, Page 39130. Volume 38, August 1992, Page 39040. 
Volume 38, May 1992, Page 38898.  
484 Congo Volume 36, July 1990, Page 37602. Volume 36, September 1990, Page 37701. 
Volume 36, December 1990, Page 37908. Volume 37, April 1991, Page 38135. 
Volume 37, June 1991, Page 38277. Volume 38, August 1992, Page 39040. Bratton 
and de Walle (1997:165) 
500 Uganda Volume 25, June 1979, Page 29672. Volume 25, June 1979, Page 29669. Volume 
26, June 1980, Page 30279. Volume 27, February 1981, Page 30711. 
500 Uganda Volume 39, February 1993, Page 39304. Volume 39, November 1993, Page 39722. 
Volume 40, March 1994, Page 39899. Volume 40, April 1994, Page 39948. 
Volume 40, November 1994, Page 40265. Volume 41, June 1995, Page 40583. 
Volume 41, September 1995, Page 40714. Volume 42, May 1996, Page 41084.  
501 Kenya Volume 38, June 1992, Page 38949. Volume 38, August 1992, Page 39040. 
Volume 38, September 1992, Page 39085. Volume 38, October 1992, Page 39133. 
Volume 38, November 1992, Page 39182. Volume 38, December 1992, Page 
39229. Volume 39, January 1993, Page 39254.  
510 Tanzania Volume 40, December 1994, Page 40314. Volume 41, February 1995, Page 40391. 
Volume 41, November 1995, Page 40810. Volume 41, December 1995, Page 
40855.  
530 Ethiopia Volume 37, May 1991, Page 38174. Volume 40, January 1994, Page 39806. 
Volume 40, April 1994, Page 39949. Volume 40, July 1994, Page 40091. Volume 
40, December 1994, Page 40313. Volume 41, January 1995, Page 40348. Volume 
41, May 1995, Page 40539. Volume 41, August 1995, Page 40665.  
541 Mozambique Volume 36, July 1990, Page 37603. Volume 36, November 1990, Page 37843. 
Volume 37, May 1991, Page 38180. Volume 40, November 1994, Page 40262. 
Volume 38, March 1992, Page 38804.Volume 39, September 1993, Page 39623. 
Volume 39, October 1993, Page 39671. Volume 40, April 1994, Page 39948. 
Volume 37, August 1991, Page 38377. 
551 Zambia Volume 36, May 1990, Page 37446. Volume 36, June 1990, Page 37523. Volume 
36, July 1990, Page 37602. Volume 36, September 1990, Page 37701. Volume 36, 
December 1990, Page 37909. Volume 37, August 1991, Page 38378. Volume 37, 
October 1991, Page 38515. 
553 Malawi Volume 38, March 1992, Page 38804. Volume 38, April 1992, Page 38851. 
Volume 38, May 1992, Page 38898. Volume 38, July 1992, Page 38995. Volume 
38, October 1992, Page 39133. Volume 39, June 1993, Page 39497. Volume 39, 
October 1993, Page 39671. Volume 39, November 1993, Page 39723. Volume 39, 
December 1993, Page 39769. Volume 40, February 1994, Page 39852. Volume 40, 
April 1994, Page 39948. Volume 40, May 1994, Page 39993.  
560 South Africa Volume 40, April 1994, Page 39942. Huntington (1991:113) 
570 Lesotho Volume 36, February 1990, Page 37238. Volume 36, March 1990, Page 37306. 
82 
Volume 37, April 1991, Page 38132. Volume 37, May 1991, Page 38179. Volume 
38, July 1992, Page 38995. Volume 39, March 1993, Page 39351. 
580  Madagascar Volume 36, May 1990, Page 37446. Volume 37, June 1991, Page 38277. Volume 
37, July 1991, Page 38324. Volume 37, August 1991, Page 38378. Volume 39, 
February 1993, Page 39308. Volume 38, August 1992, Page 39042.Volume 38, 
December 1992, Page 39229. Volume 37, November 1991, Page 38565. 
581 Comoros Volume 35, November 1989, Page 37033. Volume 36, March 1990, Page 37309. 
583 Chad Volume 41, January 1995, Page R8. Volume 41, April 1995, Page 40491. Volume 
41, May 1995, Page 40541. Volume 41, September 1995, Page 40715. Volume 41, 
November 1995, Page 40811. Volume 42, January 1996, Page 40891. Volume 42, 
March 1996, Page 40983. Volume 42, April 1996, Page 41033. Volume 42, June 
1996, Page 41129. Volume 42, July 1996, Page 41178. Volume 42, August 1996, 
Page 41218. Volume 42, October 1996, Page 41307. Volume 42, November 1996, 
Page 41356. Volume 43, February 1997, Page 41482.  
615 Algeria Volume 40, August 1994, Page 40160.Volume 40, September 1994, Page 40205. 
Volume 40, October 1994, Page 40257. Volume 40, November 1994, Page 40304. 
Volume 41, January 1995, Page 40379. Volume 41, April 1995, Page 40528. 
Volume 41, June 1995, Page 40623. Volume 41, August 1995, Page 40706. 
Volume 41, September 1995, Page 40752. Volume 41, October 1995, Page 40800. 
Volume 41, November 1995, Page 40847. 
625 Sudan Volume 31, July 1985, Page 33700. Volume 31, July 1985, Page 33703. Volume 
32, August 1986, Page 34530. 
640 Turkey Volume 27, January 1981, Page 30640. Volume 28, January 1982, Page 
31285.Volume 29, December 1983, Page 32580. Volume 29, April 1983, Page 
32089. Volume 29, July 1983, Page 32287. Huntington (1991:113) 
712 Mongolia Volume 36, January 1990, Page 37186. Volume 36, February 1990, Page 37247. 
Volume 36, March 1990, Page 37317. Volume 36, April 1990, Page 37374. 
Volume 36, May 1990, Page 37454. Volume 36, July 1990, Page 37609. 
Huntington (1991:113) 
713 Taiwan Volume 32, December 1986, Page 34814. Volume 33, September 1987, Page 
35378. Volume 38, December, 1992, Page 39236. Volume 35, December 1989, 
Page 37122. Volume 36, December 1990, Page 37917. Volume 37, April 1991, 
Page 38146. Volume 37, October 1991, Page 38530. Volume 37, December 1991, 
Page 38679. Volume 38, April 1992, Page 38862. Volume 34, February 1988, Page 
35715. Huntington (1991:113) 
732 Korea Volume 27, July 1981, Page 30997. Volume 33, January 1987, Page 34880. 
Volume 33, November 1987, Page 35508. Volume 34, March 1988, Page 35768. 
Huntington (1991:113) 
770 Pakistan Volume 18, July 1972, Page 25358. Volume 18, July 1972 Pakistan, Page 25357. 
Volume 18, December 1972, Page 25626. Volume 19, May 1973, Page 25893. 
Volume 23, April 1977, Page 28301.  
770 Pakistan Volume 31, January 1985, Page 33339. Volume 33, March 1987, Page 34990. 
Volume 34, October 1988, Page 36217. Volume 34, December 1988, Page 36347. 
Huntington (1991:113) 
771 Bangladesh Volume 35, July 1989, Page 36814. Volume 36, October 1990, Page 37775. 
Volume 36, November 1990, Page 37856. Volume 36, December 1990, Page 
37906. Volume 37, February 1991, Page 38006. Volume 37, October 1991, Page 
38533. Volume 37, March 1991, Page 38102. Volume 37, June 1991, Page 38288. 
Volume 37, August 1991, Page 38394. Volume 37, September 1991, Page 38439. 
790 Nepal Volume 36, February 1990, Page 37246. Volume 36, April 1990, Page 37373. 
83 
Volume 36, May 1990, Page 37453. Volume 36, September 1990, Page 37711. 
Volume 36, November 1990, Page 37856. Huntington (1991:113) 
800 Thailand Volume 18, January 1972, Page 25043. Volume 19, February 1973, Page 25730. 
Volume 19, November 1973, Page 26209. Volume 20, April 1974, Page 26460. 
Volume 21, April 1975, Page 27070. 
800 Thailand Volume 24, March 1978, Page 28861. Volume 25, September 1979, Page 29818.  
800 Thailand Volume 37, February 1991, Page 38003. Volume 37, March 1991, Page 38099. 
Volume 37, May 1991, Page 38194. Volume 37, December 1991, Page 38681. 
Volume 38, March 1992, Page 38816. Volume 38, April 1992, Page 38865. 
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Appendix 3: Descriptive Statistics of the Dependent Variables 
  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
Regression 78 0 1 .33 .474 
polity_next 78 -10 10 1.85 6.861 
polity_change 78 -18 7 -2.92 6.740 
polity_future 78 -10 10 1.78 7.328 
Consolidation 78 0 1 .44 .499 
 
 
 
 
 
